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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON U.S. HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND THE
SOURCES OF SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL FRAGILITY
SEPTEMBER 2016

THOMAS HERNDON
B.A., THE EVERGREEN STATE COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Robert Pollin

This dissertation consists of three essays which analyze the role of household debt
in the nancial crisis of 2007-2009, and weak recovery that followed. In these essays,
I pursue the following research topics: 1) Estimation of the eects of mortgage fraud
on losses to foreclosure, 2) Estimation of whether loan modications increased or decreased debt, and 3) Analyzing the historical evolution of housing nance regulation
to advance a proposal for reform.

While formally independent, these essays share

a common theoretical perspective located at the intersection of nancial macroeconomics and political economy.

These essays analyze how conicts of interest and

inside information in the structure of private mortgage securitization generated perverse incentives that increased nancial fragility. These problems caused large losses
to foreclosure for borrowers, investors, and the communities in which the foreclosures
were located in.
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The rst essay describes how mortgage fraud by the nancial services industry
concentrated risk and leverage on the borrowers least able to bear it. The industry
then deceived investors who bought securities based on these mortgages about the
level of risk they were taking on. This essay nds that excess losses to foreclosure
borne by investors due to fraud were substantial, prolonged through time, and concentrated in economically fragile communities that did not recover from the nancial
crisis. The second essay discusses how a conict of interest between loan servicers and
investors impeded ecient debt restructuring in loan modications. This essay nds
that instead of mitigating losses for investors by forgiving debt, servicers increased
borrowers' debt by imposing punitive fees. However, while these fees were protable
for servicers, they resulted in larger eventual losses for investors due to redefaults.
The nal essay locates the failures identied by the rst two essays within the larger
historical evolution of housing nancial regulation. This essay proposes the creation
of a new public option for household nance which would provide regulatory tools to
prevent consumer protection abuses.
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CHAPTER 1
LIAR'S LOANS, MORTGAGE FRAUD, AND THE GREAT
RECESSION
1.1 Introduction
Losses in private label residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) were at the
epicenter of the nancial crisis. These losses caused the failure of institutions heavily invested in them, as well as the failure of institutions like Bear Stearns or AIG
that were invested in complex derivatives based on them such as collateralized debt
obligations or credit default swaps. Existing economic research has shown that a substantial portion of the defaults in the loans used to collateralize these securities was
associated with fraudulent or negligent origination practices,
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that fraud was particu-

larly severe in no/low documentation loans known colloquially within the industry as
Liar's Loans, and that the quality of these loans was systematically misrepresented
to the investors that purchased these securities by all major intermediaries involved
in the sales of mortgages (Ben-David, 2011; Black, 2013; Garmaise, 2015; Grin and
Maturana, 2016; Jiang, Nelson and Vytlacil, 2014; Keys et al., 2010; Mian and Su,
2015; Piskorski, Seru and Witkin, 2015). However, as of writing the no paper has yet
estimated the eect of fraud on losses to foreclosure in the loans used as collateral for
these securities.
This paper seeks to ll this gap by 1) Accounting for total losses to foreclosure
due Liar's Loans, and 2) Estimating what portion of total losses can be considered

1 The term fraud is used in this article in the economic sense and should not be seen as having
any legal signicance. See page 5 for a full denition.
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excess from the perspective of the investor.

Losses for Liar's Loans are considered

excess if they are greater than those that would have occurred if the loan quality information disclosed to investors had been accurate instead of fraudulent. The
main ndings in this paper suggest that losses in foreclosure due to fraud in this
market were substantial, prolonged throughout the entire crisis and Great Recession
from 2007-2012, and concentrated in economically fragile geographic areas. Losses in
Liar's Loans account for roughly 70% of total losses in the data and 30% Liar's Loans
losses of can be considered excess. Projected to the level of the entire market, this
implies that no/low documentation loans can account for approximately $345 billion
of the $500 billion in losses in this market, $100 billion of which can be considered
excess. Moreover, 44% of total losses occurred in ZIP codes with the highest levels
of fraudulent income overstatement on mortgage applications. These areas were particularly poorly suited to bear these losses, and the prolonged losses to foreclosure
in these neighborhoods helps to explain the terrible economic performance of these
areas throughout the Great Recession.
The research design pursued in this paper identies the causal eects of fraud
on losses to foreclosure by comparing losses on loans in the no/low documentation
treatment group, with losses on loans with similar observable risk measures in the full
documentation control group. Systematically larger losses in the treatment group are
consistent with the causal eects of fraud. The main problem with this research design
discussed in the empirical literature is the presence of fraud in the full documentation
control group, which would cause this comparison to understate true excess losses
caused by fraud (Jiang, Nelson and Vytlacil, 2014; Grin and Maturana, 2016). To
address this issue, qualitative information on high fraud originators from lawsuits

2

regarding the actual loans in the dataset

2 These lawsuits are discussed in section 3.3.
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is used to rene the control group by

removing loans originated by these institutions. Additionally, loans from ZIP codes
with high levels of fraudulent income overstatement on mortgage applications are
removed from the control group. Regression discontinuity models based on those in
the literature are then used to conrm the presence of fraud in the full documentation
control group, as well as show that the rened full documentation control group is
meaningfully freer of fraud.
In addition to the contribution to the empirical research on fraud, the ndings in
this paper are broadly relevant for research on macroprudential nancial regulation,
and research on the role of household balance sheets in the nancial crisis. The estimate of excess losses to foreclosure is signicant for nancial regulation because these
losses have caused numerous lawsuits from investors who claim they were defrauded
by the major nancial institutions that misrepresented the quality of the mortgages
in the oering documents for the securities they purchased. Market regulations and
contractual obligations that require the accurate disclosure of asset quality are a necessary condition for the basic functioning of capital markets. However, this minimum
condition was not met on a widespread basis because all reputable intermediaries involved in the sale of mortgages were engaged in systematic misrepresentation (Grin
and Maturana, 2016; Piskorski, Seru and Witkin, 2015). The basic issue underlying
these lawsuits is succintly summarized in a recent ruling by District Judge Denise
Cote,
This case is complex from almost any angle, but at its core there is a
single, simple question. Did the defendants accurately describe the home
mortgages in the Oering Documents for the securities they sold that were
backed by those mortgages? Following trial, the answer to that question
is clear. The oering documents did not correctly describe the mortgage
loans.

The magnitude of falsity, conservatively measured, is enormous.
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Given the magnitude of falsity, it is perhaps not surprising that in
defending this lawsuit defendants did not opt to prove that the statements
in the Oering Documents were truthful.

3

[emphasis added]

From the perspective of the investor, the estimate of excess losses is signicant because it measures how much more Liar's Loans lost in foreclosure than if the oering
documents had accurately described the quality of the mortgages, rather than misrepresented it.

To eliminate the problems in this market, nancial regulation will

likely need to prioritize increased monitoring of nancial institutions, enforcement of
penalties for violations of disclosure rules including criminal prosecution for nancial institution executives involved in misrepresentation, increase investor recourse
for violations of stated representations, and limit extreme compensation packages for
executives to reduce incentives for looting.
The ndings are also relevant for historical narratives of the role of household
balance sheets in the nancial crisis because losses to foreclosure imply that household
wealth had already been entirely wiped out.

In addition to loss of wealth for the

individual homeowner, losses to foreclosure have substantial negative externalities
that cause needless loss of wealth for everyone in a neighborhood.

Research has

shown that the re sale of homes caused by large numbers of foreclosures during
the nancial crisis reduced house prices lower than they otherwise would have fallen,
and can account for roughly one-third of the fall in house prices. The reduction in
house prices further impaired household balance sheets, thereby reducing aggregate
demand. Estimates suggest the causal eects of foreclosures during the crisis were
responsible for roughly one-fth of the decline in residential investment and auto-sales

3 From ruling in

Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Nomura Holding America, May 11th, 2015.

The FHFA sued 16 trustees for misrepresentations made in oering documents and prospectuses for
securities sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. All but Nomura and Royal Bank Scotland settled
out of court, and the court ruled against these institutions in trial on May 11th, 2015. Accessed on

June 26th, 2015 from: https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2077713/
ruling-on-mortgage-fraud-in-2008-crisis.pdf
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(Mian, Su and Trebbi, 2015). Moreover, many of the investors in these securities
were institutional investors such as retirement and pension funds. Therefore losses in
these securities also contributed to losses of household wealth and retirement savings.
The prolonged losses to foreclosure due to fraud that were concentrated in economically fragile areas also help to explain the lack of recovery in these places. The
nancial panic had largely subsided by 2009. However losses to foreclosure in private
label RMBS were much more prolonged, and remained at a high level of close to $100
billion per year from 2010-2012. Fully 44% of the losses to foreclosure from 2008-2012,
or roughly $220 billion, occurred in ZIP codes with the highest levels of fraudulent
income overstatement on mortgage applications. These ZIP codes were particularly
poorly suited to bear these losses because in the pre-crisis period they had low average
credit scores, low income, high poverty rates, and high unemployment. Research has
shown that these ZIP codes experienced terrible economic performance throughout
the course of the crisis, including negative income growth, increased poverty, and
increased unemployment (Mian and Su, 2015).

1.2 Literature Review
The literature review in this section provides the necessary background context
for understanding how the main results contribute to the existing research on mortgage fraud. The existing empirical research has directly observed numerous forms of
fraud, and estimated the eects of fraud on increasing the probability of default. The
basic description of fraud that emerges from this body of research is that executives
of institutions that originated loans to be securitized in the private label market had
perverse incentives based on the volume of loans originated, rather than the quality.
To increase origination volume, these institutions systematically abandoned underwriting standards or falsied documents outright. These practices were particularly
severe in no/low documentation loans that did not require documentation of income,

5

assets, or employment, and were thus named Liar's Loans. The deceptive practices
were not disclosed to investors who purchased securities based on these loans, as required by market regulations and contractual obligations.

Finally, mortgage fraud

was clustered in economically fragile areas before the crisis and contributed to the
prolonged deterioration during the Great Recession.
The empirical research has focused on directly observing fraud, and estimating
the eects of fraud on delinquency at the loan level. However, we would also expect
fraud to cause increased losses in foreclosure because most forms of fraud resulted
in concealing increases in borrower leverage.

The analysis in this paper lls this

gap by 1) Accounting for the amount of losses to foreclosure in this market due to
no/low documentation Liar's Loans, and 2) Estimating what portion of these losses
can be considered excess from the perspective of the investor. Losses are considered
excess if they are greater than those which would have occurred if the loan quality
information disclosed to investors had been accurate, rather than fraudulent.
Fraud is dened as deception or misrepresentation with the intended to result
in nancial or personal gain.

The term fraud is used in this paper in the broader

economic sense, rather than the narrow legal sense.

Fraud is used to refer to the

economics of deception and trickery, rather than trades based on mutually benecial
gains.

The term as used here should not be seen as having any legal signicance.

That being said, much of what occurred in this market was in fact illegal.

These

fraudulent practices have led to numerous lawsuits and Department of Justice settlements, but few prison sentences. Although their is no direcrt evidence of intent in
the dataset, existing research has shown that the relevant parties in this market had
the information to be adequately aware of misrepresentation, as well as the incentives
to prot from deception (Grin and Maturana, 2016). Therefore fraud is the most
accurate term to describe the practices in this market.

6

The private label, originate to distribute supply chain consisted of institutions
which originated mortgages and sold these loans to trustees. The trustees then packaged the mortgages into securities, obtained ratings from ratings agencies, and sold
the securities to investors. Losses in these securities were at the epicenter of the nancial crisis of 2007-2008. A substantial body of research has documented a high
incidence of mortgage fraud in the loans used as collateral for these securities. For
example, as early as 2004 the FBI warned of an epidemic of mortgage fraud which
could cause a nancial crisis (Black, 2013). Also, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commision concluded that a systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics was an
essential cause of the crisis (FCIC, 2011).
Executives at institutions that originated loans to be securitized in this market
had perverse incentives to increase short-term prots based on the volume of loans
originated, rather than the quality of loans.

Executives were able to receive large

bonus compensation for short term gains, for example through stock options that were
not required to be paid back if the rm went bankrupt.

4

Fraud was particularly useful

for increasing short-term revenues because toxic loans tended to have high initial fees
attached to them. Similar to problems in the S&L crisis, this allowed originators to
report high fee revenue before losses occurred (Black, 2013). Additionally, originating
institutions could sell riskier loans to be securitized for a higher price than safer loans
(Taub, 2014).
That being said, many of the originators still held a large portion of the toxic
loans in their portfolio, and went bankrupt as a result. The pattern of extreme executive compensation, despite the failure of their rms, could reasonably be described
as looting.

Looting occurs when owners or executives have limited liability for a

4 Perverse incentives due to extreme bonus compensation were not limited to this market. They
were a consistent feature of the expansion of the nancial system following deregulation (Crotty,
2009).
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rm, and maximize short-term pay-outs at the expense of the long run health of their
rm resulting in bankruptcy. Looting has been described as bankruptcy for prot.
(Akerlof and Romer, 1993). This pattern of looting is signicant for macroprudential
regulation because skin in the game rules that require institutions to hold a portion
of the mortgages they originated in their portfolio would not have prevented fraud.
These institutions had substantial skin in the game which caused their failure. However, their executives did not. Fraud prevention would likely have required increased
monitoring of institutions, limits to extreme compensation packages, and criminal
prosecution of top executives (Black, 2013).
These perverse incentives led originators to increase loan volume through the
systematic abandonment of underwriting standards, or the outright falsication of
documents. The common eect of these fraudulent practices was for loan ocers to
conceal increases in leverage or risk in order to qualify borrowers for larger loans than
they would have been able to otherwise obtain. A recent set of empirical papers has
directly measured a high incidence of a wide variety of types of mortgage fraud. These
forms of fraud include income overstatement, asset overstatement, unreported second
liens, misreported owner occupancy status, and appraisal ination (Ben-David, 2011;
Garmaise, 2015; Grin and Maturana, 2016; Jiang, Nelson and Vytlacil, 2014; Keys
et al., 2010; Piskorski, Seru and Witkin, 2015).

For example, using conservative

measures Grin and Maturana (2016) nd that 48% of loans contain at least one
of three relatively easy to quantify forms of fraud: appraisal ination, unreported
second liens, and misreported owner occupancy status. They nd that loans with one
of these forms of fraud were 51% more likely to become delinquent.
The focus on no/low documentation loans in this study is meaningful because
these loans were so notoriously fraudulent that they were colloquially known within
the industry as Liar's Loans.

To be sure, at the time, originating no/low docu-

mentation mortgages was not prohibited as long as the stated income or assets were

8

accurate.

However, as the colloquial name indicates, these loans were not used to

accurately state borrower nancial characteristics. Indeed, loan ocers often coached
borrowers to falsely state their information, or falsied borrower documents without

5

the borrower's knowledge.

As a result, these loans performed particularly poorly.

For example, Jiang, Nelson and Vytlacil (2014) estimated the eects of income overstatement on delinquency rates in Liar's Loans, and showed that the delinquency rate
for these loans is 5-8 percentage points higher than the full documentation control
group.

6

Most forms of Liar's Loans have now been prohibited.

This body of research has also shown that these forms of fraud were systematically concealed from investors who purchased securities based on these loans.

For

example, Piskorski, Seru and Witkin (2015) found that a signicant degree of misrepresentation exists

across all

reputable intermediaries involved in the sale of mort-

gages, [emphasis in original]. The sale of loans that were originated with fraudulent
practices, or simply negligent underwriting, typically violated market regulations and
contractual obligations. These rules require the accurate disclosure of loan quality;
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however, these practices obviously were not disclosed.

All major trustees have had

5 For example, Omar Khan, a loan ocer at Ameriquest/Argent, stated, Every closing was a
bait and switch, because you could never get them to the table if you were honest.

He further

elaborated, There were instances where the borrower felt uncomfortable about signing the stated
income letter, because they didn't want to lie, and the stated income letter would be lled out
later on by the processing sta  [National Credit Union Administration Board v. Wells Fargo Bank,
National Association, 2014]. This anecdote is supported by an FBI study, which found that 80% of

fraud cases involved collusion or collaboration with industry insiders based on investigations and
fraud reports (FBI, 2007).

6 However, the authors emphasize that this should be seen as a conservative lower bound, because
the identifying assumption is that the full documentation control group is free of fraud.

7 The typical oering documents included prospectus supplements which described the quality of
collateral underyling the securities. These documents tended to include boilerplate language similar
to, Wells Fargo Bank's underwriting standards are applied by or on behalf of the Wells Fargo Bank
to evaluate the applicant's credit standing and the ability to repay the loan, as well as the value
and adequacy of the mortgaged properties collateral [General Retirement System of the City of
Detroit v. Wells Fargo et al, 2009]. If the trustee discovered a breach of these representations and

warranties, such as falsication of borrower nancial characteristics, violations of assurances that
loans were originated following proper underwriting standards, or that the appraisal value for the
collateral was inated, the trustee must notify the appropriate parties and take steps to enforce
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numerous lawsuits initiated against them.

Forensic auditing has found that in some

cases as high as 99% of the loans in an issuance were in violation of underwriting
practices stated in oering documents. One court described the problem thus: to
accept that the Trustee was unaware of...reports and investigations [regarding underwriter and servicer misconduct] would require the court to 'nd that responsible
ocers of Defendants had been living under a rock ' and that  [i]f the Trustee was
indeed 'living under a rock,' it had no right to do so given it's role and responsibilities
(Galdston, Kaplan and Gilmore, 2014). The estimate of excess losses is signicant
from the perspective of the investors. The estimate shows on average how much more
the fraudulent loans used as collateral for these securities lost in foreclosure than if
the information disclosed about them was accurate rather than misrepresented.
In contrast to the problems with originating institutions that could reasonably be
described as looting, the problems in the market for securities based on these loans
are more accurately described as a market for lemons. The term lemon refers to
a car which is poor quality, or more generally to any product that is poor quality.
A market for lemons is a market where good and bad quality products are sold, but
where the buyers cannot know beforehand whether they are buying a good or bad
product.

In these markets bad products tend to push out good products because

good and bad products must sell at the same price. Over the course of the housing

the responsible parties obligation to cure, substitute, or repurchase the defective mortgage loans
[National Credit Union Administration Board v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, 2014]. It

should be noted that origination practices that could be argued were simply negligent or dubious, but
did not involve outright falscation, were still fraudulent because they violated the representations
made in oering documents.

8 An older list of 58 lawsuits led between 2008-2012 can be found in the appendix to

?.

How-

ever, this list is not exhaustive, as the 2009 class action lawsuit used in this paper was not on
the list (General Retirement System of the City of Detroit v.

Wells Fargo et al, 2009).

In ad-

dition, several similar lawsuits have been led for violations of the False Claims Act or the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), for actions such as misrepresenting the quality of loans to entities which insured these loans.

A list of 31 lawsuits

http://www.buckleysandler.com/uploads/1082/doc/Recent-FIRREA-Cases_
BuckleySandler-LLP_v20.pdf. Accessed August 12th, 2015.
can be found at:
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bubble, it is clear that bad practices in this market had pushed good practices out
because these problems were common to all major institutions involved in the sale of
these securities (Akerlof, 1970).
As of writing, the empirical papers on mortgage fraud have primarily focused on
directly observing the incidence of fraud, and constructing loan level estimates of the
eects of fraud on delinquency. However, we would also expect the concealed leverage
and risk to cause these loans to lose more in foreclosure than non-fraudulent loans.
Ben-David (2011) provides a simple illustration of how fraud concealed increases in
borrower leverage using the example of appraisal ination in the 2006 sale of a condo
in Chicago. The condo was worth $235,000, but the builder was willing to inate the
price to $255,000 and return the extra cash to the buyer at the closing table. The
buyer could then use the extra $20,000 as a down payment for a mortgage with a
loan-to-value ratio of just under 95%. However, the true loan-to-value ratio was 100%
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because none of the borrower's own money was actually used for the down payment.

Due to this hidden increase in leverage, the loan would also be expected to lose more
in foreclosure. This paper builds on the existing literature by estimating total excess
losses for the entire market.
The estimates in this paper are also relevant for research that has shown that
the geographic areas with high levels of fraud performed poorly during the Great
Recession. These estimates of losses to foreclosure provide a quantitative description
of one of the mechanisms that caused this poor performance.

For example, Mian

and Su (2015) construct a measure of fraudulent income overstatement on mortgage applications at the ZIP code level.

10

They nd that high income overstatement

9 Alternatively, in some cases the buyer walked away with the money, used it to nance remodelings, or even to buy a new Mini-Cooper sports car in one instance. Also, loan originators often
pocketed the extra money through high origination fees.

10 They construct this measure as the dierence in the annualized growth of income reported to
the IRS, and reported on mortgage applications under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).
They nd that the housing bubble period from 2002-2005 was unique in that the growth of income
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ZIP codes performed signicantly worse with higher default rates, negative income
growth, increased poverty, and increased unemployment.

Additionally, Grin and

Maturana (2014) nd that areas with higher concentrations of originators who misreported mortgage information experienced a 75% larger relative increase in house
prices from 2003 to 2006, and a 90% larger relative decrease from 2007-2012. The
estimates of total and excess losses to foreclosure produced in this paper are signicant for understanding the poor performance of these areas. Research has shown that
foreclosures have large negative externalities which cause unnecesary destruction of
wealth for everyone in a neighborhood.

The large number of foreclosures that oc-

curred during the nancial crisis and Great Recession caused homes to be sold in a
re sale that depressed values for all houses in the neighborhood. The neighborhood
wide reduction in house prices impaired all household balance sheets in an area, reducing aggregate demand. Research has shown that the causal eects of foreclosures
during the nancial crisis and Great Recession were responsible for roughly one-third
of the decline in house prices, one-fth of the decline in residential investment, and
one-fth of the decline in auto-sales (Mian, Su and Trebbi, 2015).

1.3 Research Design
The research design section is organized into three parts. The rst part presents
the data description, the second presents the identication strategy and regression
model, and the third discusses data-driven renements for the control group. Renements are necessary for the full documentation control group because the empirical
literature has shown that full documentation loans in the private label RMBS market also had a high incidence of fraud. This contamination would cause comparisons

on mortgage applications reported in HMDA data substantially outpaced that reported on IRS
documents, while in past periods the ratio of growth in income was constant. They nd that this
was driven by fraudulent income overstatement in the private label RMBS market.

12

based on the unrened control group to understate the true eects of fraud on excess losses. Renements to reduce the incidence of fraud in the full documentation
control group are made using qualitative data from lawsuit documents, measures of
high fraud ZIP codes, and and regression discontinuity models from the empirical
literature.

1.3.1 Data Description
The sample of loans used in this study comes from the Columbia Collateral File
(CCF). The CCF is a large loan-level panel dataset that includes all loans used
as collateral in private label RMBS for which Wells Fargo is a trustee.

The data

contains monthly observations for 139 variables that include measures such as loan
characteristics and performance.

The data begins in December 2006, which makes

2007 the rst year for which complete data is available. In December 2007, the CCF
contained roughly 4.2 million total loans; 2.4 million of these loans, or 58%, were
Liar's Loans. By 2012 the number of loans in the dataset had fallen to roughly 1.8
million. This is largely due to the 1.5 million completed foreclosures that occurred.
Figure 1.1 shows the yearly outstanding balance of the the entire private label
market, the CCF, and Liar's Loans in the CCF from 2002-2012. The private label
market grew rapidly from 2002 to 2007, almost tripling in value. After peaking at
an outstanding balance of $2.7 trillion in 2007, the market experienced severe losses
and decline rapidly. The CCF was not a substantial portion of the market until 2005.
However, it grew rapidly to account for just under 40% of market share in 2007 at an
outstanding balance of $1.05 trillion.
Descriptions of fraud suggest that the intensity of fraud increased through time
peaking roughly from 2005-2007. Liar's Loans have been reported to be particularly
bad in this time period. The growth of the share of Liar's Loans in the CCF mirrors
this pattern. In 2003 the share was 40% of loans in the CCF. The share grew rapidly
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Data for oustanding balance of entire private label RMBS market comes from SIFMA.

to peak at two-thirds in 2007.

The share has remained high at about 60% from

2007-2012 (SIFMA, 2015).
The CCF data from 2007-2012 appears to be broadly representative of the entire
market. In general, the data accounts for a substantial portion of the entire market
and mirrors the growth of the market. Also, the summary statistics of observable risk
measures are similar to those in Grin and Maturana (2016) and Piskorski, Seru and
Witkin (2015). The dataset also contains loans originated by roughly 2000 dierent
institutions.

11

However, there is also some reason to believe that the loans in the CCF

performed better than average for the market. Wells Fargo was not found to be one

11 There were approximately 7000-8000 entries for originator names in the CCF. However, redundancies in originator names occur across numerous dimensions such as capitalization, slight variation
in name, spacing, etc. Therefore the actual size of the list is likely closer to 2000 originators.
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of the ten originators with the highest incidence of fraud by Grin and Maturana
(2016).

This is corroborated by anecdotal reporting that the subprime origination

practices at Wells Fargo were not as bad as for other institutions in the market.
This led Wells Fargo to emerge from the crisis in a much better position than many
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other nancial institutions.

Additionally, Wells Fargo has been the subject of fewer
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lawsuits than many other institutions.

Therefore, to the extent that fraudulent

practices were less prevalent in the loans for which Wells Fargo was a trustee, the
estimate of total and excess losses in this paper may understate losses to fraud in the
entire market.
The main risk measures in this dataset are the FICO credit score and the loanto-value (LTV) ratio. The LTV ratio is the ratio of the original loan balance to the
appraisal value of the home and is a measure of the amount of leverage for a given
mortgage.

The LTV ratio measures the amount of equity in a home which serves

as a cushion to absorb house price declines.

The FICO credit score is an index of

creditworthiness that measures the borrower's chance of default over the next two
years. A higher credit score indicates a less risky borrower. The score is based on the
amount of debt a borrower currently owes, the borrower's payment history, types of
credit in use, the length of credit history, and new credit.
The sample of loans from this dataset is restricted to all mortgages that are
1st lien, owner occupied, originated between 2002-2008, with loan-to-value ratios
between 70 and 100, FICO credit scores between 300 and 850, balances greater than
$30,000, and for which there are complete data.

The pooled sample is built by

merging the December data to provide a retrospective snap shot of the year. After
these restrictions, the nal 2007-2012 pooled sample includes slightly over 7 million

12 For

example,
see
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/
21586295-big-winner-financial-crisis-riding-high

13 For example, Wells Fargo appears far fewer times than other institutions on the two lists of
lawsuits in footnote 8.
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loan-year observations. The sample also includes roughly 700,000 of the 1.5 million
unique foreclosures. A large portion of foreclosures are typically dropped the month
after the foreclosure sale is recorded, so dropped foreclosures are merged back into
the December observations.
To my knowledge this study is the rst to use this dataset in the context of measuring the eects of fraud on losses to foreclosure. However, the sample is compiled
from trustee reports so it is most similar to the data used in Grin and Maturana
(2016) and Piskorski, Seru and Witkin (2015). The main advantage of this data relative to others used in the literature is that this data contains detailed information on
losses to foreclosure. It is not clear if information on losses to foreclosure is availale
in the other data sources used in the empirical literature. However, no other paper
has measured losses in foreclosure due to fraud.
The ideal dataset for comprehensively estimating the total eects of fraud would
be a loan-level panel set which included measures that recorded whether a loan was
fraudulent or not, what type of fraud, and how intense the fraud was (i.e., whether
income was overstated 5% or 50%). The obvious main disadvantage of data from the
CCF is that it does not directly measure fraud in this manner. Others have been able
to directly measure certain easy to quantify types of fraud by matching loan-level
records with data from other sources such as credit bureau records. However, these
data come from large proprietary datasets which as of writing I do not have access
to.
To address the limitation of not being able to directly observe all forms of fraud,
I restrict the analysis to only estimating the eects of fraud on losses to foreclosure
in no/low documentation loans. These loans were known colloquially within the industry as Liar's Loans because they were notoriously fraudulent. These loans were
overwhelmingly used to overstate borrower income or assets. Therefore the estimates
produced in this paper do not represent exhaustive estimates of losses due to all forms
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of fraud, but are limited to only measuring losses based on lack of documentation.
Additionally, addressing this limitation also requires renements to the full documentation control group to reduce the incidence of fraud. These renements are detailed
in the section 1.3.3.

1.3.2 Identication Strategy and Regression Model
Fraudulent loans are expected to cause increased losses to foreclosure because most
forms of fraud result in concealing borrower leverage and risk. This analysis identies
the causal eects of fraud on excess losses to foreclosure by comparing losses for loans
in the no/low documentation treatment group with losses for loans with similar risk
measures in a rened full documentation control group. Excess losses in the treatment
group which cannot be explained by observable risk measures are consistent with the
causal eects of fraud.
The mean dierences in losses to foreclosure between treatment and control groups
can be decomposed into two portions.

E[L|Di = 1] − E[L|Di = 0] = {P (F C|Di = 1) − P (F C|Di = 0)}E[L|F C, Di =
1] + {E[L|F C, Di = 1] − E[L|F C, Di = 0]P (F C|Di = 0),
where

L =loss

in foreclosure,

FC

= foreclosure, and

Di

is an indicator variable

coded 1 for the treatment group. The rst of these terms is the increase in losses due
to the extra foreclosures caused by fraud. The second term is the increase in losses
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for Liar's Loans conditional on foreclosure (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).

I use a simple linear regression models to estimate these eects in two steps. The
regression model is:

yizt = αz + γt + β0 + β1 ∗ Di + Λ ∗ Xi + i

,

14 In addition to conditioning on foreclosure and treatment status, these means also need to be
conditioned on appropriate controls. These subscripts have been omitted to facilitate ease of presentation.
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where

yi

is one of four outcome variables,

is a vector of controls,

αz

Di

is the binary treatment variable,

is a set of ZIP code level xed eects, and

γt

Xi

are loan-year

observation xed eects. Standard errors are clustered at the ZIP code level for all
models. This model is run for the pooled sample of loans; however, the results are
robust to running the model for each year seperately.
The rst set of regressions measures estimates the increase in the foreclosure rate
using an indicator variable coded 1 for loans that were foreclosed on during a year.
The second set of regressions measures the increase in losses in dollars using data
from the variable loss on liquidated property. This variable likely includes all home
forfeiture actions more broadly, such as short sales or deeds in lieu. These actions are
all substantially similar to foreclosure because they require loss of the home. I also
estimate extra delinquencies using an indicator variable coded 1 for loans that were
delinquent at least once during the year. Finally, I estimate losses as a share of the
original balance. This helps normalize losses to foreclosure to help ensure that the
dollar value estimates are accurate. Foreclosure and delinquency rates are estimated
in the full pooled sample, while losses are estimated conditional on foreclosure.
The set of controls includes risk measures, loan type, loan purpose, origination
years, and original balance. The principal risk measures employed are the loan-tovalue (LTV) ratio and FICO score. A set of indicators for low, medium, and high
LTVs are used for the regressions. Low LTVs are those with LTVs of 80 and under,
which is the traditional cut o for the classic mortgage. High LTVs are those with
LTVs of 95 or higher because this is a common cut-o for inclusion into RMBS pools.
LTVs between 80 to 95 are considered medium leverage mortgages.
Indicators are also included for FICO credit scores. The OCC Mortgage Metrics
report denes subprime loans as those with FICO scores less than 620, alt-A loans as
those with FICO scores between 620 and 660, and prime loans as those with FICO
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scores above 660. In addition an indicator is also included for FICOs greater than
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760, which is the cut o for the FICO High Achievers list.

Indicator variables for loan type and purpose are also included in the regressions
as well. The dataset has two broad types of mortgages: xed rate and adjustable.
Fixed rate mortgages are typically considered the least risky, while adjustable rate are
considered higher risk. Finally, indicator variables for origination year and observation
year are also included.
Formally, identication depends on

E[i |Di , Xi , αz , γt ] = 0.

This condition should

be largely satised because the highly detailed micro data allows for ne-grained
controls for risk measures, geographic shocks, or dierent shocks by year. Comparing
loans with similar risk measures, in the same ZIP codes, and within the same years
should eliminate selection bias on observables.

In addition, I conduct the Oster

(2014) robustness test in section 5 to assess the stability of estimated coecients due
to selection on unobservables.
There are also two known problems with this identication strategy. These problems would both cause the estimates to understate the true causal eects of fraud on
losses to foreclosure. The rst problem is that estimating excess losses conditional
on foreclosure introduces the conditional-on-positive selection bias. The estimate of
excess losses conditional on foreclosure can be decomposed into a causal eect and a
selection bias. Selection bias arises due to fraud changing the composition of those
who are foreclosed on (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). In this case, the bias likely understates the true eects of fraud because fraud lowers the threshold for those that are
foreclosed on in the treatment group. At the margin, the set of foreclosed loans in the
Liar's Loans group should therefore be larger and contain more borrowers who were

15 This

denition

comes

from

myco.com.

Accessed

6-25-2015

http://ficoforums.myfico.com/t5/Understanding-FICO-Scoring/
Expanded-quot-FICO-High-Achievers-quot-scores-of-760-and-above/td-p/111525.
from:
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less risky than the full documentation group. This selection bias would understate
average losses. Thought of slightly dierently, the set of borrower's who were selected
into foreclosure in the full documentation group were more risky on average ex-ante
because they ended up in foreclosure despite having better loans. The inclusion of
appropriate controls for risk to some extent should mitigate some of this selection
bias, but it is unlikely to completely eliminate it.

That being said, the estimation

of the eects of fraud on delinquency and foreclosure rates are unaected by this
bias and still have a causal interpretation. To the extent that risk controls do not
mitigate this selection bias, the estimates of losses conditional on foreclosure in this
paper would understate the true causal eects of fraud.
The second problem with this identication strategy is the presence of fraud in the
full documentation loan control group. This problem has been well documented in
the existing research and would cause the estimate of excess losses to understate the
true eects of fraud (Jiang, Nelson and Vytlacil, 2014). For example, the widespread
incidence of fraud in full documentation loans in this market was conrmed by Grin
and Maturana (2016). They found that roughly half of full documentation loans contained at least one of three easy to measure types of fraud: appraisal overstatement,
misreported owner occupancy status, or unreported second liens. Therefore, renements to the control group to remove full documentation loans with a high probability
of fraud are necessary and will be described in the next section. Surprisingly, Grin
and Maturana (2016) also found a similar incidence of fraud between full documentation and Liar's Loans for these measures. However, Grin and Maturana (2016)
were not able to estimate dierences in income or asset overstatement which is likely
the main dimension of fraud on which no/low and full documentation loans dier.
Therefore, the comparison of these loans should still provide an estimate of meaningful dierences in fraud provided that renements are made to the control group.
To the extent that the renements do not completely purge fraud from the control
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group, we would also expect the estimates in this paper to underestimate the true
causal eects of fraud. For these reasons, the estimates produced in this paper are
best interpreted as a conservative lower bound for the true causal eects.

1.3.3 Renements to the Control Group
I make two renements to the control group to remove loans with a higher probability of containing fraud. First, I use qualitative information from lawsuit documents
concerning the actual loans in the dataset to remove loans originated by institutions
notorious for employing fraudulent practices. Second, I remove loans from ZIP codes
with high levels of fradulent income overstatement on mortgage applications. I then
use regression discontinuity models based on those in the empirical literature to conrm the presence of fraud in the control group, and show that the rened control
group is meaningfully freer of fraud than the unrened control group.
The sample of loans used in this article is from the Columbia Collateral File (CCF)
which includes all publicly available collateral les for RMBS for which Wells Fargo
serves as a trustee. Wells Fargo has been sued at least twice for misrepresenting the
qualities of these loans in oering documents.

In 2011, Wells Fargo settled a class

action law suit for approximately $125 million with several retirement funds that
sustained large losses on RMBS purchased from Wells Fargo

System of the City of Detroit v. Wells Fargo et al, 2009].

[General Retirement

As of time of writing, Wells

Fargo is also being sued by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) for
severe losses on $2.4 billion in RMBS purchased by ve credit unions, which caused
the liquidation of the ve institutions

[National Credit Union Administration Board

v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, 2014].
These lawsuits provide important qualitative information concerning the high incidence of fraudulent practices at particular loan originators, with a total of twenty-ve
institutions discussed in depth in both lawsuits. High fraud originators are one of 25
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institutions whose fraudulent practices were described in depth in either lawsuit document, while low fraud originators are institutions who are not mentioned in either
lawsuit document.
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Even though the high fraud originators are only 25 institutions

out of a possible list of approximately 2000 institutions, these originators were also
some of the larger institutions and originated approximately half of the loans in the
sample with data recorded for originator name, depending on year. While the study
makes use of lawsuit documents which target Wells Fargo, this study should not be interpreted as singling out Wells Fargo for uniquely poor practices. Deceptive practices
were common to all institutions in this market, and all trustees have had numerous
lawsuits initiated against them. Moreover, as discussed above there is reason to believe that the practices at Wells Fargo may have been less fraudulent than average
for this market.
Two regression discontinuity models based on loans clustering at LTV intervals of
5 are used to conrm fears of the presence of fraud in the unrened full documentation
control group, and that the renements provide a control group more free of fraud.
Grin and Maturana (2016) nd that a large portion of loans in this market were
discontinuously clustered at LTV intervals of 5 units (75, 80, 85, etc.) which can be
seen in Figure 1.2 below.

They nd that appraisal overstatement was consistently

higher for clustered loans, and that these loans consistently defaulted at a much higher
rate. They conclude that this pattern is more consistent with appraiser's targeting
home valuations given by loan ocers than with a random pattern of mistakes.

16 The originators named in the NCUA lawsuit are: Ameriquest/Argent, Bank of America, Countrywide, Decision One, DLJ, First Franklin, Fremont, GreenPoint, Impac, Morgan Stanley Mortgage
Capital, National City, New Century, Option One, Paul Financial, RBS/Greenwich Capital, WMC
Mortgage Corp; and the originators named as defendants or named in testimony in the retirement
fund lawsuit are: American Home Mortgage (named in testimony), Bank of America, Bear Stearns,
Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, RBS/Greenwich Capital,
UBS, and Wells Fargo.
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The rst model measures excess losses at the LTV intervals. The regression discontinuity model measures the increase in negative outcomes for loans clustered at the
LTV intervals of 5, which have been shown to have a higher incidence of fraud. The
regression discontinuity model includes an indicator for clustered loans, and controls
for a fourth degree polynomial of LTV. The model is:

Yi = αz + γt + β0 + β1 Z0 + β2 ltv + β3 ltv 2 + β4 ltv 3 + β5 ltv 4 + ΓXi + i ,
where

Z0

is an indicator variable for loans with clustered ltv values, and the

rest of the controls are the same as those used in the main regressions. The excess
losses measured by the estimated coecient for

Z0

are distinct from the excess losses

presented as the main result. The coecient for

Z0

measures excess losses for loans at

the LTV interval compared to loans within the same documentation type not at the
LTV interval, rather than compared to a fraud-free control group. Therefore, this is a
useful tool to measure the incidence of fraud within a single documentation type, but
not across types. Results for this test can be seen in Table 1 and Figure 1.3 below.
The second model based on this discontinuity is to use the McCrary (2008) heaping test for manipulation of the running variable. This test measures the threat to
identication in regression discontinuity designs of agents strategically manipulating
treatment status.

The test rst divides the data into a rough histogram based on

the running variable, and then smooths the histogram on either side of the breakpoint being tested. Manipulation of treatment status would produce heaping at the
breakpoint, which is measured as the log dierence in the height of the smoothed
polynomials tted on either side of the breakpoint. This test is relevant to the current analysis because it is likely that a substantial portion of the heaping seen at LTV
intervals of 5 comes from loan ocers telling appraisers to target a specic valuation
price that would produce the desired LTV ratio. The heaping test only allows a single
breakpoint to be tested, so the data are recentered around the LTV intervals. The
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default bin size of 1 and bandwidth are used. Results for this test are presented in
Table 1.1 and Figure 1.4 below.

Table 1.1.

Results for Excess Losses and Heaping from Regression Discontinuity

Models Based on LTV Clusters
Excess Negative Outcomes
Loss/Orig Balance

Loss ($)

Excess Heaping
Log Dierence

N

3.24

296657

Full Doc

∗∗∗
0.00739

Unrened
High Fraud
Semi-Rened
Rened

2734.3

∗∗∗

(4.44)
∗∗
0.0127

(6.92)
∗∗∗
3971.9

(.003)

(3.35)

(3.91)

(.008)

-0.00241

1939.3

3.18

(-0.61)

(1.88)

(.007)

-0.00557

1634.8

3.40

(-0.60)

(0.75)

(.014)

3.65

66327
57769
15379

No Doc
Unrened

∗∗∗
0.0139

5400.7

(11.08)
∗∗∗
6289.2

(.003)

High Fraud

(9.29)
∗∗∗
0.0152

(5.58)
∗∗∗
4958.9

(.007)

Semi-Rened

(5.16)
∗∗∗
0.0101

(5.74)
∗∗
5764.6

(.005)

Rened

(3.21)
∗∗∗
0.0208
(3.59)

(2.59)

(.011)

∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗

p < 0.01,

∗∗∗

∗∗∗

3.43
3.64
3.41
3.39

374910
90430
108424
22140

p < 0.001

This table presents results from regression discontinuity models based on loan clustering at LTV intervals of 5, by
documentation type and level of renement. Columns 1 and 2 present results for excess losses, with t -statistics in
parentheses. Column 3 presents results from the McCrary heaping test (log-dierence) with standard errors in parentheses.
Column 4 presents the total number of loans (N) by level of renement. The unrened group uses all loans within a
documentation type. The high fraud group uses all loans from high fraud originators within a documentation type. The
semi-rened group removes all loans from high fraud originators. The fully rened group also removes all loans from
high fraudulent income overstatement zip codes.

Table 1.1 presents results from the two tests. Columns 1 and 2 show results for
excess losses, while column 3 presents results from the McCrary test. T-statistics are
reported in parentheses for excess losses while standard errors are reported in parentheses for the heaping test. The table compares regression discontinuity results for
the unrened full documentation control group, full documentation loans from high
fraud originators, the semi-rened full documentation control group which removes
full documentation loans from high fraud originators, and the fully rened full documentation control group which removes loans from high fraud originators as well
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as those originated in ZIP codes above the median level of fraudulent inome overstatement.

These groups are also compared for no/low documentation loans.

The

basic ndings in this table are 1) the unrened sample of full documentation loans
shows measures consistent with fraud, while 2) both semi- and fully-rened full documentation control groups exhibit fewer measures associated with fraud than the full
documentation control group. Additionally, measures consistent with fraud are found
for both semi- and fully-rened no/low documentation groups, so it is unlikely that
the null nding for semi- and fully-rened full documentation loans is spurious.
The test for excess losses showed that unrened full documentation and high fraud
full documentation loans clustered at LTV intervals of ve exhibited excess losses, relative to loans in these groups not clustered at LTV intervals. Excess losses for these
groups ranged from roughly $3,000-$4,000 dollars. Unrened and high fraud no documentation loans also showed excess losses which were larger than those estimated
for full documentation loans in these categories by roughly $2500.

In contrast to

unrened and high fraud full documentation loans, semi-rened and fully rened full
documentation groups did not exhibit statistically signicant excess losses. However,
semi-rened and fully-rened no documentation groups did exhibit excess losses similar to unrened and high fraud groups. This suggests that the null nding for semiand fully-rened full documentation groups is not spurious.
The results for the excess losses for loans clustered at LTV intervals can also
be seen in Figure 1.3.

Figure 1.3 displays excess losses for the unrened control

group, high fraud full documentation loans, and the fully rened control group. The
graph shows that excess losses for the unrened control group and high fraud full
documentation loans consistently reach local maximums at the LTV intervals of ve,
shown with reference lines.

For these two groups, the local spikes all consistently

coincide with the LTV intervals. However, this pattern does not occur for the rened
control group.

The spikes in excess losses for the rened control group almost all
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Excess Losses at LTV Intervals of Five for Full Doc Loans
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occur away from the LTV intervals of 5, with approximately equal amounts occuring
above as below the LTV intervals. This suggests that the pattern of losses for the
rened control group is more random, while the pattern for the other two groups is
not.
The McCrary tests in Table 1.1 showed signicant heaping for all groups. However,
high fraud loans showed consistently more heaping than any other group.

When

considered with the positive excess losses, this suggests that the full documentation
loans from high fraud originators are appropriate for removing from the control group.
The semi- and fully-rened groups also still exhibited excess heaping.

While this

heaping was not associated with statistically signicant excess losses, this raises some
concern that fraud has not been completely purged from the control group. To the
extent that some fraud remains in the fully-rened control group, the estimates in
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Net Heaping for High Fraud and Rened Full Doc Loans
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this paper would understate the true eects of fraud. Figure 1.4 shows heaping for
high fraud and fully rened groups. The data is centered around the LTV intervals to
facilitate visual comparison. As can be seen, both groups exhibit a subtantial amount
of heaping. That being said, the rened group exhibits less heaping than the high
fraud group.
The nal table in this section shows the distribution of covariates between the
Liar's Loans treatment and fully-rened full documentation control groups to assess
any possible observable selection bias. Table 1.2 is divided into three panels. Panel
A shows mean loan information including the original loan balance, LTV and FICO
score. Panel B presents the distribution of risk measures, loan type, and loan purpose between groups. Finally Panel C presents loan performance information. The
basic nding in this table is that the control group consistently has worse observable
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risk measures than the treatment group. To the extent that this selection is not entirely mitigated by the risk controls, we would expect the estimates in this paper to
underestimate the true eects of fraud.
In panel A, we see that the control group has a slightly lower original balance than
the treatment group. This is consistent with the slightly riskier average measures for
the control group. The control group mean FICO score was roughly 30 points lower
than that for the treatment group, while the LTV was 3 percentage points higher.
Panel A also shows the number of loans in the treatment and control group.

The

renements removed a substantial portion of loans from the control group. Removing
loans from high fraud originators caused the largest drop in loans because only roughly
half of the data contained originator names.

17

Removing loans from ZIP codes above

the median fraudulent income overstatement also removed a large portion of loans.
Only roughly one-third of the loans in the CCF were originated in ZIP codes below
the median level of income overstatement. However, there are still over 200,000 loans
left so lack of statistical power should not be a problem.
Panel B shows the distribution of LTV ratios, FICO scores, loan purpose, and loan
type between these groups. The control group had a signicantly larger proportion of
subprime FICO scores than the treatment group, which had roughly 67% of loans with
credit scores prime or higher. The treatment group also had 80% of loans with LTV
ratios 80 or under. This is a high proportion of loans that should have had a large
equity cushion to absorb house price declines of up to 20%.
also had less risky loan types and purposes.

The treatment group

Cash-out renances were notoriously

abused during the housing bubble, and the treatment group includes fewer cash-out
renances. The treatment group does include more adjustable rate mortgages, which

17 While only half of the data contains originator names, all observations contain data for the
current servicer of the loan. As will be more fully discussed in the robustness section, the estimates
in this paper are robust to including high fraud servicers in the high fraud originator measure to
preserve some of the data.
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Table 1.2.

Sample Description

Panel A: Loan Information (mean)
Original Balance ($)
Loan-to-Value
FICO Score
N

Treatment

Control

324,749

274,638

80.9

83.5

684.7

652.4

3,695,068

204,529

Panel B: Distribution of Risk Measures, Loan Type, and Purpose (%)
Treatment

Control

Sub Prime

12.5

36.4

Alt-A

20.4

20.7

Prime

55.2

31.5

High Achiever

11.9

11.4

LTV <= 80

80.3

61.5

80 < LTV <= 95

13.5

24.1

95 <= LTV

6.3

14.5

Fixed Rate

32.7

49.2

Adjustable Rate

67.3

50.8

Purchase

53.0

40.5

Renace

13.9

16.1

Cash-out Renance

33.1

43.4

FICO Score

Loan-to-Value

Loan Type

Loan Purpose

Panel C: Loan Performance
Treatment

Control

Delinquency Rate (%)

46.8

38.0

Foreclosure Rate (%)

10.2

7.5

176,315

97,675

Mean Loss in Foreclosure ($))
Loss/Original Balance (%)

57.8

50.3

LTV if Foreclosed (mean)

81.6

84.8
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were riskier than xed rate mortgages.

However, on net, the treatment group has

substantially better observable risk measures. Due to the better risk measures in the
treatment group, if selection bias persists despite the inclusion of controls, we would
expect this bias to understate the true eects of fraud.
The nal panel shows loan performance statistics. The poor performance of these
loans is without precedent in recent history. For example, the delinquency rate between 1995-2005 averaged roughly 2%, and peaked at 11% during the crisis. Despite
having better observable risk measures, the treatment group had a delinquency rate
almost 9 percentage points higher than the already high delinquency rate of the control group.

This dierence alone is almost the entire peak rate for all mortgages

during the crisis. Additionally, the foreclosure rate was roughly 25% higher for the
treatment group. These loans also lost a large amount in foreclosure at close to 60%
of the original balance or $176,000. Combined with the roughly 80% mean LTV of
foreclosed Liar's Loans, the average loss of close to 60% of the original balance implies
that the value of the home must have declined by roughly 80% of the appraised home
value. In contrast, the control group lost slightly less of the original balance despite
having a higher mean LTV.

1.4 Main Results
Section 1.4 presents the main results for total and excess losses to foreclosure
caused by fraudulent Liar's Loans. The main ndings in this section are that total
and excess losses in foreclosure due to fraud were substantial, prolonged, and concentrated in neighborhoods particularly poorly suited to bear the losses. Losses to
foreclosure for the entire private label RMBS market totaled roughly $500 billion from
2007-2012. Roughly 70%, or $345 billion, of these losses are accounted for by losses
in no/low documentation Liar's Loans. Of this $345 billion, roughly $100 billion can
be considered a conservative lower bound estimate for excess losses. This implies that
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excess losses in Liar's Loans alone account for 20% of total market losses. Fourty-four
percent of total market losses occurred in ZIP codes above the 75th percentile of fraudlent income overstatement. These neighborhoods were already economically fragile
before the nancial crisis and experienced terrible economic performance throughout the Great Recession. The prolonged foreclosure crisis was a signicant factor in
explaining this poor performance.
The results in this section are presented in two tables and one gure.

Table

1.3 presents estimates of excess foreclosures, delinquencies, and losses conditional on
foreclosure. Table 1.4 uses these estimates to calculate total and excess losses at the
level of the entire market. Finally, Figure 1.5 shows the distribution of these losses
through time.

Table 1.3.

Main Results:

Excess Negative Outcomes for Liar's Loans in Pooled

Sample

No Controls
Loss ($)

26083.4

Some Controls

∗∗∗

21290.1

(22.61)

(20.05)

∗∗∗
0.106

Loss/Orig Balance

N

0.0906

N

22912.3

∗∗∗

(29.02)
0.0911

∗∗∗

Unrened
11112.8

∗∗∗

(42.98)
0.0359

∗∗∗

(18.47)

(28.27)

(42.84)

390289

390289

390289

671567

0.0290

(22.53)
Delinquency Rate (%)

∗∗∗

Preferred

(20.43)

∗∗∗
0.0269

Foreclosure Rate (%

∗∗∗

∗∗∗

(27.86)

∗∗∗
0.0903

0.128

∗∗∗

0.0209

∗∗∗

(27.68)
0.0980

∗∗∗

0.0175

∗∗∗

(55.51)
0.0812

∗∗∗

(26.28)

(48.33)

(48.54)

(103.13)

3899597

3899597

3899597

7018803

t statistics in parentheses

∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗

p < 0.01,

∗∗∗

p < 0.001

Table 1.3 shows the main results for excess foreclosures, delinquencies, and losses
conditional on foreclosure for Liar's Loans in the pooled sample. The table presents
results from regressions of the outcomes on the no/low documentation indicator,
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with 1) no controls, 2) risk controls only, 3) all controls, and 4) the unrened full
documentation control group with all controls. Specications one to three move from
least saturated to most saturated models, with the most saturated model being the
preferred estimate. The unrened specication is included to allow us to assess the
the size of the eects of the renements.

Specication one regresses each outcome

on the treatment indicator, and only controls for the size of the original balance.
Specication 2 also includes sets of controls for the LTV ratio, FICO score, loan
purpose, and loan type. Finally, specication three also includes ZIP code level xed
eects, indicators for origination year, and loan-year observation xed eects.
All specications in this table show statistically and economically signicant results for all outcomes. The results are also reasonably consistent across specications.
The preferred estimate in this table shows that the conditional foreclosure rate was
roughly 2.1 percentage points higher than that for the control group.

This result

implies that fraud caused a 30% relative increase in foreclosures compared to the
control group foreclosure rate of 7.5%, or equivalently that roughly one-fth of Liar's
Loans foreclosures were excess. Excess losses conditional on foreclosure in dollar values for the preferred specication were just under $23,000. To the extent that the
risk controls do not completely eliminate COP selection bias, this represents an underestimate of the true causal eects. However, the size of this estimate is plausible
and consistent with descriptions of the size of the average fraud in the literature. In
the example of appraisal ination presented by Ben-David (2011), the price of the
home was inated $20,000. Excess losses as a share of the original balance for the
preferred specication were 9 percentage points of the original balance. The average
loss as a share of the original balance for the rened control group was 50%. This
implies that Liar's Loans lost 20% more conditional on foreclosure than the control
group average.
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Excess foreclosures estimated for the unrened control group are also consistent
with those estimated for the rened group.

The increase in the foreclosure rate

for this specication was 1.75 percentage points, which is similar to that estimated
for the rened model. Excess losses conditional on foreclosure were just under half
as large as those estimated for the rened specication.

The dierence in losses

suggests that the renements did meaningfully reduce the incidence of fraud in the
unrened control group. This also helps to assess how sensitive the nal results are
to the renements employed. As discussed in greater depth in the next section on
robustness test, estimates from other alternative renements fall in between estimates
using fully-rened and unrened control groups.
Excess delinquencies were also large and consistently averaged just under 10 percentage points across specications. This increase is quite substantial at roughly 25%
greater than the average delinquency rate of 38% for the rened control group. Additionally, the estimates of excess delinquencies are within the range of estimates in
the existing research. The increase is slightly higher than the 5 - 8 percentage point
increase reported by Jiang, Nelson and Vytlacil (2014) which was based on their
unrened full documentation control group.

However, the increase in excess delin-

quencies was less than the 50% - 60% increase in the delinquency rates estimated by
Piskorski, Seru and Witkin (2015) and Grin and Maturana (2016). These results
were produced by directly observing fraud and are therefore the most credible in the
literature. This suggests that the renements made to the full documentation control
group may not have completely eliminated the presence of fraud. That being said,
the increase in excess losses to foreclosure estimated with the rened group was larger
than this increase. This suggests that unrened and rened estimates provide a reasonable bracket for the true eects, assuming that COP selection bias is mitigated by
the inclusion of risk controls.
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Table 1.4.

Total and Excess Losses to Foreclosure for the Entire Private Label

RMBS Market from 2007-2012

Panel A: Total Losses and Foreclosures
Full CCF

Entire Market

All Loans

$321.54

$892.95

Liar's Loans

$220.05

$611.10

Foreclosed Balance (billions $)
Losses to Original Balance in Foreclosure (billions $)
All Loans

$179.51

$498.51

Liar's Loans

$125.06

$347.30

All Loans

1,473,244

4,091,345

Liar's Loans

890,960

2,474,284

Total Foreclosures

Panel B: Excess Losses and Foreclosures in Liar's Loans
Full CCF

Entire Market

$25.63

$71.16

Total Liar's Loans Excess Foreclosures

182,560

506,986

Average Loss in Foreclosure

$140,384

-

Unrened

$7.87

$21.86

Rened

$16.23

$45.08

$33.50
$41.86

$93.02
$116.24

Losses due to Extra Foreclosures (billions $)
Excess Losses in Foreclosure (billions $)

Total Excess Losses (billions $)
Unrened
Rened
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Table 1.4 shows total and excess losses from 2007-2012 projected to the level of
the entire market using the average CCF market share. Panel A shows total losses
and foreclosures. The total foreclosed balance in the CCF was $321.5 billion, which
implies a total market foreclosed balance of almost $900 billion.

Over half of this

foreclosed balance was not recovered through foreclosure auctions. Losses for Liar's
Loans accounted for 70% of total losses, and 40% of the foreclosed balance.

Raw

numbers of foreclosures were also substantial at 1.5 million in the CCF, and 4 million
for the entire market. In comparison, estimates of the total number of foreclosures
for the nancial crisis and Great Recession suggest that roughly 5 million foreclosures
occurred, and an additional 5 million home forfeiture actions similar to foreclosures
occurred.

18

Therefore, the CCF dataset accounts for roughly 15% of total home

forfeiture actions that occurred, and the private label market accounts for roughly
40%.
Panel B presents the total amount of excess losses and foreclosures implied by
the regression results, which are substantial. Excess losses due to extra foreclosures
and excess losses conditional on foreclosure are presented seperately, as well as the
total eect.

To project the ndings from the sample to the level of the full CCF,

the average loss conditional on foreclosure for Liar's Loans in the full CCF is used,
roughly $140,000. This is less than the sample average Liar's Loan loss of 180,000

19

largely because LTV ratios of less than 70 were omitted from the sample.

Excess losses due to extra foreclosures is simply the number of excess foreclosures
times the average loss in foreclosure. This is not presented seperately for rened and
unrened groups because the regression estimates implied similar amounts of excess
foreclosures for these groups. Roughly 20% of Liar's Loans foreclosures were excess,

18 http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2013/10/foreclosure-crisis-update.html
19 Excess losses for the market using the sample average loss of $180,000 total roughly $112-$135
billion for the unrened and rened control groups respectively.
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Total and Excess Losses Caused by Liar's Loans from 2007-2012
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which implies that over 500,000 Liar's Loans foreclosures at the level of the market
were excess. The eect due to extra foreclosures totaled $71 billion for the market,
which is where the bulk of excess losses occured. The eect due to loss conditional on
foreclosure is the loss conditional in foreclosure times the number of non-excess Liar's
Loans foreclosures.

At the level of the market, the loss conditional on foreclosure

eect ranged between $21-$45 billion. These results imply total losses ranging from
$93-$112 billion for this market. Total excess losses account for 40% of total Liar's
Loans losses, and 20% of total market losses. While these losses are quite substantial,
it is worth re-emphasizing that they are best seen as a conservative lower bound.
Figure 1.5 shows the level of total market losses, total Liar's Loans losses, and
excess Liar's Loans losses for each year from 2007-2012. This gure is signicant because it shows that the bulk of losses to foreclosure were substantially more prolonged
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than the nancial crisis. The market panic had largely subsided by 2009. However
there were over $125 billion in losses to foreclosure in 2009, and between $75-100
billion in losses in each year from 2010-2012.

These losses were disproportionately

concentrated in geographic areas that were economically fragile before the crisis, and
help to explain the lack of recovery in these areas.
Fully 44% of these losses, or close to $220 billion, occurred in ZIP codes above
the 75th percentile of fraudulent income overstatement on mortgage applications.

20

Similar to the ndings for the entire market, 70% of total losses can be accounted for
by Liar's Loans. These prolonged losses are signicant for the lack of recovery in these
areas because existing research has shown that foreclosures have substantial negative
externalities.

Foreclosure sales cause house prices, and thus wealth, to decline for

every home in the neighborhood, which depresses local aggregate demand.

Mian,

Su and Trebbi (2015) nd that the causal eects of foreclosures can account for onethird of the total fall in house prices, one-fth of the decline in residential investment,
and one-fth of the decline in auto sales.

These eects contributed to the terrible

performance of high income overstatement ZIP codes. Mian and Su (2015) found
that these ZIP codes experienced negative income growth from 2005-2012, as well as
increases in poverty and unemployment.

1.5 Robustness Analysis
Section 1.5 discusses the robustness of the main results presented in section 1.4.
This section discusses the robustness of the results to dierent model specications
and the sensitivity of estimates to dierent levels of control group renement, and
formally tests for coecient stability to bias from unobservable confounders using

20 The measure of income overstatement used in this paper is slightly dierent than that in Mian
and Su (2015). The measure used in this paper matches census tracts to ZIP codes through the
free program developed by the Missouri Data Center as in Adelino, Schoar and Severino (2015),
rather than the proprietary bridging used in Mian and Su (2015).
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the analysis developed in Oster (2014). Overall, the main results hold up well across
dierent specications or levels of renement, and are stable to bias due to unobservables.
The main results presented in section 1.4 are reasonably robust to model specications with dierent geographic levels of xed eects and dierent sample restrictions,
and across loan types or purposes. The estimates are robust to including either state
or county level xed eects, which both produce slightly larger estimates than ZIP
code level xed eects. To an extent, ZIP code level xed eects represent a conservative assumption, because it is known that fraud was clustered by ZIP code. Therefore
the xed eects may pick up some of the eect that is rightly attributed to the treatment indicator. These estimates are also consistent in the unrestricted full sample.
Finally, the estimates are robust across loan types and purposes, with coecients
similar to those estimated in the full sample. In general, xed rate loans, renance,
and cash-out renance loans showed excess losses slightly larger than those previously
estimated, while ARM mortgages and primary purchase loans showed excess losses
that were slightly less.
The estimates are also reasonably robust to dierent levels of renement.

Un-

rened and rened full documentation control groups produce estimates that range
from $93 - $112 billion. This range brackets estimates produced by dierent levels of
renement. For example, the semi-rened group produces an estimate close to $100
billion. Other alternative renement restrictions also fall in this range. For example,
I was concerned that rening the control group by removing loans from high fraud
originators inadvertently removed too much data because only half of the observations had data for originator name, while all observations had servicer name data. To
make sure that this was not the case, I coded the servicers for high fraud servicers and
reintroduced the data that was dropped. The results for the semi-rened and fully
rened group for this model were slightly larger than $100 billion. Therefore, it is
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reasonable to conclude that the range of estimates given by the unrened and rened
control groups credibly bracket the sensitivity of the estimates to dierent levels of
renements.
While the visual comparison of the estimates produced by diering levels of controls in Table 1.3 suggest that the estimates are reasonably stable, it is still useful
to formally test for coecient stability using the method developed in Oster (2014).
This analysis formally tests for the stability of coecients to bias due to unobservable confounders by comparing co-movements in coecients and

R2

in models which

include and exclude controls. The bias adjusted coecients are dened as:

(R2

−R2

β = βlong − (βshort − βlong ) R2max−R2long
long

where

β

)

,

short

is the bias adjusted beta,

βlong

from the regression which includes controls,

R2

βshort

from the regression without controls, and

2
Rlong

and

and

2
Rmax

are the coecient and

2
Rshort

R2

are the coecient and

is the maximum

R2 .

The short

regressions correspond to the no control model specication in Table 3, while the long
regressions correspond to the preferred specication. The test is performed under the
assumption of equal selection, which assumes unobservables are equally as important
as observables. Additionally, the test uses the recommended
described in Oster (2014), this assumption for

2
Rmax

2
Rmax

of

2
1.3 ∗ Rlong
.

As

is conservative because only 90%

of true results estimated using constructed data survive this threshold.

Table 1.5.

Results from Oster Bias Adjustment for Fully Rened Estimates

Adjusted Coecient

Loss ($)

Loss/Original Balance

Foreclosure (%)

Delinquency (%)

19124

.08615

.01908

.1003

This test shows that the estimates are stable and that any bias due to unobservables is likely slight.

All bias adjusted coecients are quite close to non-adjusted

coecients. The estimate of excess losses conditional on foreclosure is still close to
$20,000. The adjusted foreclosure rate is still roughly 2 percentage points. Losses as
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a share of the original balance are within a half percentage point of the non-adjusted
estimate. Finally, the delinquency rate is slightly higher than the non-adjusted estimate. Therefore this test suggests that any bias due to unobservables is slight even
if we assume that unobservables are equally as important as observables.
The estimates produced in this paper are stable across specications and robust
to dierent modeling assumptions.

However, it needs to be emphasized that these

estimates are best interpreted as conservative lower bounds for the true causal eect
of fraud on excess losses to foreclosure for three main reasons. First, the renements
may not have completely removed fraud from the control group because the estimates
of excess delinquencies are still much lower than those estimated in research that directly observes fraud. Second, the COP selection bias is likely not entirely mitigated
by the inclusion of controls for risk. This understatement is also concerning because
the eects from loss conditional in foreclosure were substantially less than those due to
extra foreclosures. Finally, the sample appears broadly representative of the market
in terms of risk measures, and also contains a broad portion of the market. However,
there is reason to believe that the practices at Wells Fargo may have been less fraudulent than average for the market. For these reasons, the estimates may understate
the true eects of fraud. While these estimates of show that a substantial portion of
the losses in this market are due to fraud, they are best interpreted as a conservative
lower bound.

1.6 Conclusion
The ndings in this paper and the broader research on fraud have shown deep
seated problems with deception in the structure of nancial intermediation. Accurate
disclosure of the quality of collateral backing securities is a minimum condition for
the basic functioning of asset markets.

However, this condition was not met on a

widespread basis, with disastrous consequences. These problems with deception led
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to historic losses of wealth for savers who invested their retirement funds in these
bogus securities, for borrowers who were given mortgages that were counter to their
best interests, and for the communities which experienced the prolonged foreclosure
crisis. Losses in no/low documentation Liar's Loans account for 70% of total losses
to foreclosure in the data. A conservative lower bound estimate for excess losses suggests that $100 billion, or roughly 30% of total Liar's Loans losses, can be considered
excess. Moreover, 44% of total losses occurred in ZIP codes with the highest levels
of fraudulent income overstatement on mortgage applications. These areas were particularly poorly suited to bear these losses, and the prolonged losses to foreclosure
in these neighborhoods helps to explain the terrible economic performance of these
areas throughout the Great Recession.
Borrowers and savers lacked sucient protections against fraud in part because,
at the time, the dominant view was that these protections were unneccesary. It was
argued that in a free market a nancial institution's interest in maintaining their reputation would be sucient to prevent dishonest activities on a large scale. Moreover,
complex nancial innovations were seen as eciency enhancing because they allowed
prices to more fully reect new information about fundamentals. A sad irony of the
nancial crisis is that at precisely the time that these arguments were being made,
all of the major nancial institutions involved in the sale of mortgages were falsifying
and misrepresenting the information needed to accurately price these innovations.
Instead of reputation providing incentives for honest dealing, the reputation of the
major nancial institutions was used to support the deception by making investors
less suspicious of the securities they purchased (Akerlof and Shiller, 2015).
In light of the widespread problems revealed by the nancial crisis, the dominant
pre-crisis view of the impossibility of dishonest practices should be seen as naive,
and now discredited.

To address these problems will require the creation of new

protections for borrowers and savers, as well as more aggressive enforcement of existing
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protections. Moreover, nancial regulation needs to prioritize increased monitoring of
nancial institutions, limit extreme executive compensation, and criminally prosecute
nancial institution senior executives engaged in deception and fraud.
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CHAPTER 2
PUNISHMENT OR FORGIVENESS? LOAN
MODIFICATIONS IN PRIVATE LABEL RESIDENTIAL
MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES FROM 2008-2014
2.1 Introduction
A major factor contributing to the Great Recession and weak recovery in the U.S.,
from 2008-2014, was instability in the household mortgage market. Following historic
declines in house prices, the default rate on household mortgages increased from the
historical average of 2% to a high of 11% in 2010.

1

These defaults resulted in waves

of foreclosures that were highly costly to borrowers who lost their homes, investors
in securities or derivatives based on these loans, and the communities in which the
foreclosures occurred. When facing a large number of defaults, a standard tool for
preventing foreclosures is modifying delinquent mortgages to forgive debt. Forgiving
debt mitigates losses through preventing foreclosures, and provides economic stimulus through deleveraging borrowers.

However, mortgages can also be modied to

increase debt, instead of forgiving it, through capitalizing missed interest payments
and fees. Increasing debt reduces the eectiveness of modications at loss mitigation
and providing stimulus.
This paper examines the extent to which voluntary modication of privately securitized mortgages either increased or forgave debt during the Great Recession and
weak recovery from 2008-2014. I focus on loans used as collateral for mortgage-backed

1 Data on the delinquency rate for U.S. household mortgages is available from the St.

Louis

Federal Reserve FRED database. Accessed June 15th, 2016 from: http://research.stlouisfed.org/
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private label securities (PLS), because this is where the largest portion of defaults
occurred. The market for residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) in the U.S.
is divided into two portions: agency and non-agency. Agency RMBS are securities
issued by government sponsored entities, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Nonagency RMBS, also known as private label RMBS, are those securities issued by the
private institutions. The PLS market is where the bulk of subprime mortgages were
securitized, and hence where the largest portion of defaults occurred. I account for
the increase or decrease in debt due to modications using a loan-level panel dataset
which covers roughly 30%-40% of the PLS market, depending on year.
There are three primary ndings in this paper.

First, the total net increase to

borrower debt balances due to modications for the entire PLS market from 20082014 was $20 billion. Second, the net amount of debt added per modication grew
from 2010-2014, roughly doubling from 5.6% to 11.3% of the original balance.

Fi-

nally, I nd that the growth in the amount of debt added per modication is not
consistent with capitalization of increased numbers of missed interest payments, because the number of missed interest payments per modication remained constant
from 2010-2014.

Therefore, the growth in the amount of debt added is consistent

with increased capitalization of fees such as delinquency fees. Additionally, my data
show that modications which reduced debt were rare, with only 5% of modications
resulting in net reductions of debt. Also, foreclosures were much more common than
modications, with 88% more foreclosures occurring. These foreclosures were highly
costly, with losses ranging from 45%-65% of the original loan balance, and totaling
almost $600 billion from 2008-2014. In contrast, the gross amount of forgiveness only
totaled $18.8 billion. The large dierence between losses to foreclosure and debt forgiven suggests that there was ample room to increase forgiveness to mitigate losses
to foreclosure.

45

To be sure, 75% of modications in my sample did reduce borrower monthly payments, and so provided some relief even if increasing debt balances. However, through
increasing negative equity, the increase in debt by modications blunted the ability of
modications to mitigate losses or provide economic stimulus. Modications that increased debt impeded loss mititgation because they had signicantly higher redefault
rates than those that reduced debt (Haughwout, Okah and Tracy, 2009). Moreover,
increasing negative equity, rather than eliminating it through debt forgiveness, guaranteed that redefaults would result in costly foreclosure because the borrower could
not sell the home without paying the lender the dierence between the amount owed
and the sale price.
Increasing negative equity also reduced the stimulative eects of debt restructuring.

First, increasing negative equity did not reduce the need for substantial

cuts in borrower spending to deleverage and rebuild lost savings.

Negative equity

also reduced the eectiveness of monetary policy because it prevented the borrower
from gaining access to external nance, such as renancing at lower interest rates
(Mian and Su, 2014). Negative equity also reduced aggregate demand by reducing
the incentive to invest in the household, because all gains would go to the lender.
Haughwout, Sutherland and Tracy (2013) nd that from 2007-2012, households with
negative equity decreased residential investment by 75%. Finally, the increased redefault rate led to more foreclosures with substantial negative externalities for the
communities in which they occurred. Foreclosures reduce house prices for all homes
in the community, thus further depressing aggregate demand. Mian, Su and Trebbi
(2015) nd that the causal eects of foreclosures can account for roughly one-third
of the decline in house prices, one-fth of the decline in residential investment, and
one-fth of the decline in auto sales from 2007-2009.
The ndings in this paper are also consistent with reports of a principal-agent
problem between investors in privately securitized mortgages, and the servicers of
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these loans who are responsible for processing payments and managing defaults (Levitin and Twomey, 2011; Thompson, 2011; COP, 2009). This principal-agent problem
is caused by the perverse incentives built-in to the servicers' cost-plus compensation
structure once a loan enters default. Servicers' compensation structure does not align
their interests with the investors' interest in maintaining the net present value of the
loan. Instead, servicers' compensation is based on three main parts. First, servicers
receive a fee assessed on the unpaid principal balance of the loan. Second, servicers
receive oat income based on the time in which the servicers receive payments from
borrowers, but have not yet remitted them. Finally, once a loan enters into default,
servicers are able to receive income from a diverse array of fees, including but not
limited to late fees, title search fees, property maintenance fees, appraisal fees, and
other fees related to the foreclosure.

These fees are paid by lenders in addition to

borrowers, because the fees can be recovered through the proceeds of foreclosure sales
prior to lenders receiving any revenue.

The ability to assess these fees eectively

creates a cost-plus compensation structure with little oversight.
The misalignment of servicer and investor interests caused two forms of perverse
incentives directly relevant to the interpretation of the ndings in this paper. First,
this compensation structure can make foreclosure more protable to servicers than
modifying, even when modifying is in the best interest of investors, because they
can charge expensive fees with little oversight.

Second, when servicers do modify,

they favor modications that increase borrower indebtedness through capitalizing
missed interest payments and fees, because these will increase their income based on
a xed-rate of the unpaid principal balance. These type of modications are not in
investors' interests because they have a high redefault rate. However, servicers are
able to receive additional income from these redefaults through charging additional
fees (Levitin and Twomey, 2011; Thompson, 2011; COP, 2009). The ndings in this
paper of the increase in debt added per modication being driven by fees, as well as the
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larger frequency of foreclosure than modications, even when foreclosures produced
large losses, are consistent with these perverse incentives.
This work extends the previous ndings of White (2008) and a 2010 study by the
Congressional Oversight Panel (COP, 2010) to cover the entire course of the recovery
from the Great Recession, from 2010-2014. These earlier papers found that 68% of
voluntary modications of privately securitized mortgages (White, 2008), and 95%
of modications done through the Home Aordable Modication Program (HAMP)
(COP, 2010) during 2008 and 2010, respectively, increased borrower debt balances by
roughly 5%. My ndings extend this analysis by showing that the increase in debt
added per modication doubled from 2010-2014, and calculating the total amount of
debt added by modications throughout the Great Recession and weak recovery. My
ndings show that the problems identied in these previous papers worsened during
the subsequent years. Indeed, the total net addition to debt balances was larger in
2014 than in any other year in the sample, with the exception of the peak crisis year
of 2010.
The remainder of this paper is organized into two sections.

The rst section

reviews the relevant literature and background information needed to understand the
results. The second section presents the data description and main ndings.

2.2 Literature Review and Background Information
This section presents a review of the relevant literature and discusses the background information necessary to understand the main results. This section begins by
discussing the role of loan modications in mitigating losses to foreclosure.

I then

describe in further depth the market failure of the principal-agent problem between
servicers and investors outlined in the introduction, and how it caused an inecient
level of loss mitigation in privately securitized loans.
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Loan modications which reduce debt are seen as a standard tool for loss mitigation. In general, household debt forgiveness produces mutually benecial gains to
both borrower and lender through avoiding high costs associated with foreclosure.
Houses sold in foreclosure typically sell at steep discounts, averaging roughly 27% of
the home price, for two main reasons. First, housing is a classic example of an illiquid
asset, but nancial institutions typically have an incentive to sell a home as rapidly
as possible once it enters foreclosure. Therefore, forced sales require larger discounts
than if the market were fully liquid. Second, the house may also have become physically damaged during the foreclosure process (Campbell, Giglio and Pathak, 2011).
Moreover, foreclosures also have negative externalities that lower prices for all homes
in the neighborhood. Mian, Su and Trebbi (2015) estimate that the causal eects of
foreclosures can account for roughly one-third of the total decline in home values from
2007-2009. They also estimate that the destruction of wealth from these foreclosures
also lowered aggregate demand, accounting for one-fth in the reduction of residential
investment and auto sales during this period.
Estimates during the Great Recession showed that the mutually benecial gains
to avoiding foreclosure could have been substantial. For example, the Congressional
Budget Oce (CBO) analyzed dierent options for principal reduction for delinquent
borrowers who have mortgages owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
They found that debt forgiveness sucient to reduce loan-to-value (LTV) ratios to 100
or 90 percent through principal reduction could have saved Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac $2.8 billion for reducing the LTV to 100, or $2.1 billion for reducing the LTV to
90. Therefore, even if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had undertaken loan modications
for delinquent borrowers that were generous enough to give the borrowers 10% equity
in their home (i.e.

to reduce the LTV to 90), they would still have saved slightly

over $2 billion. Giving the borrower positive equity in their home would also have
prevented a foreclosure if the modication redefaulted, because the borrower could

49

sell their home without having to pay the lender the dierence between the sale price
and the amount owed on the home (Moore and Remy, 2013).
Due to mutually benecial gains to avoiding foreclosure, lenders tend to look for
alternatives including modifying the original terms of the loan to forgive some portion
of the debt. However, several problems in the structure of private label securitization
prevented modications in loans used as collateral for these securities, even in cases
where modication was ecient for both borrower and investor. First, mortgages held
in securitization pools are governed by a contract known as a pooling and servicing
agreement (PSA). These contracts dene the roles and responsibilities of all parties
to the securitization, such as the transfers of the loans into the trust, management
of the trust, issuance of securities to investors, servicing of the loans, and permissible
actions that can be taken once a loan is in default. However, research has shown that
roughly 40% of securitized mortgages are governed by PSAs with some clause that
restricts servicer modication ability (Gelpern and Levitin, 2009).
Second and more relevant to the interpretation of the results in this paper, there
is also a principal-agent problem between servicers and investors that impedes restructuring even when it was in the investor's interest. Servicer's compensation is not
aligned with the investors interest in maximizing the net present value of the loan.
Instead, servicer's choice of modication or foreclosure, and type of modication, is
based on the incentives in their own compensation structure. Servicers receive three
main types of income: a xed-rate fee based on the unpaid principal balance of a
loan; oat income from the period in which the servicer receives monthly payments
but has not remitted them to the trust; and ancillary fees. The main types of ancillary
fees include delinquency fees and reimbursement for costs associated with foreclosure,
such as property maintenance fees, title search fees, process serving fees, appraisal
fees, other legal fees, or any of a number of other fees. There is no eective oversight
of the reasonableness of these fees, and servicers are able to be reimbursed for these
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fees out of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale prior to any revenue being given to
investors. This misalignment of incentives creates two related problems which prevent
ecient restructuring (Levitin and Twomey, 2011; Thompson, 2011; COP, 2009).
First, these fees can be quite lucrative and create an incentive to foreclose, even
when it is in the investors best interest to modify, because modication is costly.
Modication is costly for three reasons. First, modications require substantial labor
costs such as reunderwriting the loan. Second, if the modication reduces monthly
payments through reducing the unpaid principal balance, the servicer loses its xed
rate fee. Third, servicers must advance missed payments while the loan is delinquent.
They can recoup these advances in cases of foreclosure or if the loan becomes current,
but not in many types of modications. In contrast, the fees associated with managing
delinquency and foreclosure can be quite lucrative. For example, analysis of one major
servicer, Ocwen, showed that late fees and loan collection fees made up 18% of it's
revenue in 2008 (Thompson, 2011). There can also be an incentive to keep a borrower
delinquent so that the servicer can receive revenue from delinquency fees, until the
cost of nancing advances outweighs the revenue received from the fees. This has been
described as keeping the borrower in a default fee sweatbox (Levitin and Twomey,
2011).

Essentially, the servicer's choice between modication and foreclosure is a

choice between limited xed-price income and a cost-plus contract arrangement with
no oversight of either the costs or the plus components, (COP, 2009). Even worse
for the investor, this cost-plus structure creates an incentive to foreclose in a more
costly manner than less, because servicer's compensation is positively related to costs
and has the senior claim on foreclosure sale revenue.

Cost-plus compensation is

typically banned from government contracts due to these perverse incentives (Levitin
and Twomey, 2011; COP, 2009).
The second problem created by this compensation structure is that it provides
incentives for servicers to choose types of modications that promote their own inter-
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ests, even if these modications have a higher redefault rate and hence do not promote
the investor's interests. For example, reducing monthly payments through principal
reduction has been shown to be the most eective form of modication at preventing
redefaults (Haughwout, Okah and Tracy, 2009; Goodman et al., 2012).

However,

servicers are disincentivized to perform principal reduction because it reduces the
amount of revenue they receive from their xed-rate servicer fee, which is assessed on
the unpaid principal balance of the loan. In contrast, servicers prefer modications
that increase the unpaid principal balance of the loan through capitalizing missed interest payments and fees because this increases the revenue from their xed-rate fee.
But these modications that increase borrower indebtedness have higher redefault
rates, which result in costly foreclosure for investors. Providing unsustainable modications designed to redefault can also be a source of prot for servicers, because they
can receive the lucrative foreclosure fees described above (Thompson, 2011; COP,
2009).
An obvious question is what is preventing market competition from correcting the
principal-agent problem by creating incentives for good servicers who can meet the
needs of investors? Market competition is unlikely to self-correct the misalignment of
incentives because of information and collective action problems. Investors faced two
main collective action problems in changing this structure.

First, many PSAs had

collective action clauses requiring a super majority of investors to amend any contractual terms. However, there were typically large numbers of geographically dispersed
investors party to most of the major securitizations. Second, the investors often had
dierent interests regarding the type of loan modication they would desire because
they received compensation based on dierent parts of the cash ow, such as principal or interest payments. Therefore, some modications would be favorable to some
subset of investors, while wiping out a dierent subset of investors. Even if investors
could overcome the collective action problem, they also lacked the necessary data to
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evaluate loss mitigation practices of servicers, such as loan-level data concerning the
reunderwriting of modications. Moreover, investors typically lacked detailed information on the amount of fees being assessed by servicers. These collective action and
information problems eectively undermined investors ability to perform meaningful
oversight of servicers (Levitin and Twomey, 2011).
The cumulative eect of market failures in the structure of securitization was
to make the level of modication for loans in this market ineciently low.

The

dierence in the amount modications between securitized loans and loans held in
bank portfolios suggest that modications for securitized loans are ineciently low.
Recent estimates have shown the mortgages held in private securitization pools were
less likely to be modied than loans held in banks portfolios, by 26%-36% (Agarwal
et al., 2011) or 13%-32% (Piskorski, Seru and Vig, 2010).

Additionally, Maturana

(2016) found that an additional modication for the marginal loan reduced losses
by 40% relative to the average loss.

This suggests that the marginal benets to

modication were substantially higher than the marginal costs, which implies that
the level of modications was ineciently low. Substantial losses for borrowers and
lenders alike could have been avoided through modications rather than foreclosures.
The perverse incentives in servicers' compensation also helps to explain why the
public intervention to promote more modications through the Home Aordable Modication Program (HAMP) fell short of it's stated goals. The HAMP program sought
to induce more voluntary modications through providing incentive payments to servicers for performing more modications. However, when compared to the possible fee
compensation from foreclosing, these incentives were too small to promote an ecient
level of modications (Levitin and Twomey, 2011). The initial HAMP program was
created in 2008 and designed to provide roughly 3-4 million modications. However,
ve years into the Great Recession, it had only provided 860,000 permanent modications (Mian and Su, 2014). In addition to the principal-agent problem, another
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reason for the failure of HAMP is that many servicers simply lacked the capacity to
handle the necessary volume of modications (Agarwal et al., 2012).
The incentives in the servicers' compensation structure also caused a large portion
of the voluntary modications in the PLS market which did occur to be unsustainable
because they often increased borrower debt balances and monthly payments. A study
of voluntary PLS modications found less than half of the modications reduced
monthly payments. Moreover, 68% of modications increased borrower debt balances
by capitalizing unpaid interest and fees. The average amount capitalized was $10,800
on a balance of $225,000.

In contrast, only 10% of these modications included

principal reduction (White, 2008).
Voluntary modications through the HAMP program also resulted in increasing
borrower debt balances. However this was largely due to program design. The HAMP
program did prohibit the capitalization of delinquency fees, however the program also
mandated capitalization of missed interest payments. The HAMP program then reduced borrowers monthly payments through a combination of interest rate reductions
and term extensions. Overall, reports showed that 95% of HAMP modications increased borrower negative equity by roughly 5%.

Redefault rates were also quite

high. For some of the early vintages of HAMP modifcations, close to 50% redefaulted
within the rst year (COP, 2010, 2009). The previous studies of White (2008) and
COP (2010) which documented modications increasing borrower debt balances are
the closest studies to the analysis in this paper.
The perverse servicer incentives are relevant to the interpretation of redistribution inherent in modications in two ways. First, to the extent that the increase in
debt balances represents the imposition of arbitrary fees by servicers due to cost-plus
compensation, the increase in debt balances can be unambiguously interpreted as
an increase in total borrower debt obligations. This is relevant because some have
interpreted capitalization of missed interest payments alone as not increasing total
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borrower obligations (COP, 2010). The ndings in the next section will show that
a substantial portion of the increase in debt is consistent with increases in punitive
fees, but not increases in missed interest payments. Therefore, a large portion of the
ndings can be interpreted as an increase in total borrower obligations.
Second, the perverse servicer incentives are also relevant to the interpretation
distribution of losses from the housing bubble which is inherent in the restructuring
of mortgage debt. Debt contracts are inherently distributional in that they specify
that borrower equity takes the rst losses from house price declines. In this context,
the distributional conict at the root of the renegotiation of debt terms was which
party would bear the losses from the collapse of house prices. Would debtors be made
to bear the all losses from the house price decline, or would there be a more equitable
split between borrowers and investors (Mian and Su, 2014; Farhi and Werning,
2013)?
The outcome of this renegotiation was that modications would concentrate all
losses from the house price decline on debtors. If borrower equity was insucient to
absorb these losses, the borrower would be left with negative equity. In addition to
taking all losses from the house price declines, debtors would take additional punitive
losses due to delinquency or other fees imposed upon them by servicers. However,
the choice to essentially punish debtors for the house price collapse, rather than to
forgive them, resulted for larger losses for investors as well. It appears that the only
party that beneted from this destruction of wealth was servicers. In eect, it was
in their interest to destroy wealth by making the foreclosure process costlier through
the imposition of arbitrary fees.
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2.3 The Increase in Borrower Debt Balances from PLS Modications
Two early reports suggested that voluntary modications tended to increase borrower debt balances by capitalizing missed interest payments and fees (White, 2008;
COP, 2010). However, to my knowledge no study has provided a systematic description of whether voluntary modications continued to increase borrower debt balances
throughout the course of the recovery from the Great Recession, and if so, by how
much. This study seeks to contribute to the literature on household balance sheets
by providing a systematic description of the increase in borrower debt balances by
loan modications in the PLS market from 2008-2014.
There are three primary ndings in this paper. First, for the entire PLS market
from 2008-2014, loan modications resulted in a total net increase to borrower debt
balances of $20 billion. Second, the amount of net debt added per modication grew
from 2010-2014, roughly doubling from 5.6% to 11.3% of the original balance, or
$16,000-$26,000. Finally, the growth in amount added per modication is consistent
with growth in fees assessed by servicers, but not increased numbers of missed interest
payments, because the number of missed interest payments per modication remained
constant from 2010-2014. This resulted in the average amount of capitalization per
delinquency increasing from $1,761 to $3,488 from 2010-2014. This nding suggests
that the growth in net debt added per modication from 2010-2014 is consistent with
the agency problems due to servicer's cost-plus compensation structure described in
the previous section. This also implies that the increase in borrower debt balances
can be unambiguously interpreted as an increase in total borrower debt obligations.
My data also showed that foreclosures were much more common than modications, with 88% more foreclosures occurring. These foreclosures were highly costly,
with losses ranging from 45%-65% of the original loan balance. In contrast, modications which reduced debt were rare, with only 5% of modications resulting in net
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reductions of debt. Modications which resulted in net forgiveness of debt were also
tightly limited to a small subset of servicers, with one servicer, Ocwen, accounting for
roughly 60% of these modications. Finally, cumulative losses to foreclosures during
the full sample period totaled almost $600 billion, while the gross amount of forgiveness only totaled $18.8 billion. The large dierence between losses to foreclosure and
debt forgiveness suggests that there was ample room to increase forgiveness to mitigate losses to foreclosure. The remainder of this section is organized into two parts.
The rst part presents a basic description of the dataset, and the second presents the
main ndings.

2.3.1 Data Description
This section presents the basic description of the dataset. This section includes
description of the source of data, major variables for measuring modications and
foreclosures, major risk measures, and the restrictions used to construct the sample
from the larger dataset. The section also discusses the relation of this dataset to the
larger PLS market, and the performance of these loans through time.
The sample of loans used in this study comes from the Columbia Collateral File
(CCF), which is the same dataset used in White (2008). The CCF is a large loanlevel panel dataset that includes all loans used as collateral for private label RMBS for

2

which Wells Fargo is a trustee.

The full dataset contains monthly observations for 139

variables such as loan characteristics and performance. The data begin in December
2006, which makes 2007 the rst year for which complete data are available.

The

number of loans and outstanding balance peaked in December 2007, with 4.2 million
loans.

However, by 2014 the number of loans in the dataset had fallen to roughly

1.44 million. This is primarily due to the 1.9 million completed foreclosures which
occurred.

2 This dataset is publicly available from

www.ctslink.com.
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The CCF data provide several variables measuring modications including modication date and type of forgiveness or increase of debt. The CCF added variables to
measure types of debt forgiveness or capitalization in November of 2008, which makes
2009 the rst year for which we have complete data on redistribution in modications.
Types of debt forgiveness measured include principal forgiveness, interest forgiveness,
and expense forgiveness. Total capitalized amount is the only variable which records
the amount of debt balance increase.

Capitalization in modications occurs when

missed interest payments or fees are added back to the outstanding balance of the
loan. Unfortunately, the dataset does not provide separate measures of capitalization
due to missed interest payments or fees. The data also do not include whether the
modication occurred through the HAMP program. However, servicers which sign up
for the HAMP program are required to use the HAMP template for all modications
that meet HAMP requirements. Many of the servicers in this dataset participated
in HAMP, so it is likely that many of the modications in the CCF data are HAMP
modications (COP, 2010).
The variable used in this study to measure foreclosures is titled loss on liquidated
property.

This variable measures the dollar value of losses to the lender due to

having to sell the home for a price below the amount of debt owed on the loan.
This variable measures any losses due to the sale of the home, which includes broader
home forfeiture actions such as short sales or deeds-in-lieu, in addition to foreclosures.
Foreclosures, short sales, and deeds-in-lieu are the three most common types of home
forfeiture actions. These actions occur when a borrower is delinquent, but the value
of the home is less than the amount owed on the loan, so that the borrower cannot sell
the home. A foreclosure occurs when the lender forces the sale of the home to repay
the value of the debt. A short sales occurs when the borrower nds a purchaser for
the home at an amount below what is owed on the loan, and then gets the lender to
consent to the sale. A deed-in-lieu of foreclosure occurs when the delinquent borrower
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signs over the deed to the lender to prevent foreclosure from occurring. The lender
will then need to sell the home. Borrowers tend to prefer short-sales or deeds-in-lieu
because they are less damaging to a borrower's credit score than foreclosure.

The

results for losses to foreclosure reported in the next section are actually losses due
to home forfeiture actions more broadly dened. It is satisfactory to combine these
broader home forfeiture actions under the label of foreclosure for the purposes of
comparing losses due to home forfeiture with debt forgiveness in modications.
The main risk measures in the dataset are the FICO credit score and the loanto-value (LTV) ratio.

The FICO credit score is an index of creditworthiness that

measures the borrower's chance of default over the next two years, with a higher
credit score indicating a less risky borrower. The score does not provide an absolute
measure of chance of default. Instead, the score provides a ranking of a borrower's
crediworthiness relative to other borrowers.

The score is based on the amount of

debt a borrower currently owes, the borrower's payment history, types of credit in
use, the length of credit history, and new credit. However, the exact formula used to
calculate how each of these categories aects a credit score is proprietary, and thus
not publicly available. Additionally, the weight given to each of these categories in
calculating the credit score diers for each individual based on their particular credit
history (Bhardwaj and Sengupta, 2015).
FICO scores range between 300-850, and are used to classify borrowers as subprime, alt-A, and prime. Subprime credit scores are those with FICO scores less than
620, alt-A are between 620 and 660, and prime are greater than 660. These categories
are one factor that is used to determine what type of loan a borrower can receive,
the amount of the loan, and the interest rate of the loan. Typically, prime borrowers
qualify for the lowest interest rates and largest loans.
The LTV ratio is the ratio of the original loan balance to the appraisal value of
the home.

The LTV ratio measures the amount of equity in a home which serves

59

Outstanding Balance of the PLS Makret 2002-2014

0

1000

Billions ($)

2000

3000

Figure 2.1.

2002

2004

2006

2008
PLS Market

2010

2012

2014

CCF

as a cushion to absorb house price declines. For example, a loan with an LTV of 80
can withstand a price decline of 20% of the value of the home before the borrower
would have negative equity in the home. If the home was sold in foreclosure after this
decline in value, the lender would typically take this loss. Traditionally, LTV ratios
of 80% or below are considered lower risk mortgages.
The growth of the outstanding balance of loans in the CCF broadly mirrors that
of the PLS market. Figure 2.1 shows the nominal yearly outstanding balance of the
PLS market and the CCF from 2002-2014.
from 2002 to 2007, tripling in value.

The private label market grew rapidly

After peaking at an outstanding balance of

$2.7 trillion in 2007, the market experienced severe losses and declined rapidly. As of
2014, the outstanding balance of the PLS market was $957 billion, which was roughly
equal to the 2002 outstanding balance. The CCF was not a substantial portion of
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the market until 2005. However, it grew rapidly and accounted for just under 40% of
market share in 2007, with an outstanding balance of $1.05 trillion. The outstanding
balance in the CCF then declined rapidly throughout the sample period, ending 2014
with roughly $350 billion outstanding (SIFMA, 2015).
The CCF data appear to be broadly representative of the entire market. In general, the data account for a substantial portion of the entire market and mirrors the
growth of the market. Also, the summary statistics of observable risk measures are
similar to those reported in Grin and Maturana (2016) and Piskorski, Seru and
Witkin (2015), who use data based on this market. Because it appears representative of the entire market, the full CCF dataset from 2008-2014 is used to produce
calculations for the entire market in Table 2.1, based on the yearly market share of
the CCF.

3

Additionally, a restricted sample of loans from the CCF is used to analyze

average redistribution in modications and losses to foreclosure. Following common
practice in the literature which analyzes the PLS market, the sample of loans from
this dataset is restricted to all mortgages that are 1st lien, owner occupied, originated
between 2002-2008, with loan-to-value ratios between 70 and 100, FICO credit scores
between 300 and 850, balances greater than $30,000, and for which there is complete
data.
These restrictions help to ensure that we are analyzing a consistent group of loans,
and to prevent data errors. Loans are limited to those that are 1st lien loans because
these are qualitatively dierent from junior liens.

If a home is sold in foreclosure,

junior liens are only paid back once the rst lien is paid in full. Due to this dierence
in priority, comparing average modication and foreclosure experiences across these
groups would be less informative than focusing on 1st liens exclusively. The sample

3 I use 2008-2014 for the calculations in this table, rather than the full 2006-2014, because November 2008 is the rst month in which redistribution information is recorded for modications. Therefore, comparing total losses to foreclosure from 2006-2014 with total debt added in modications
from 2008-2014 would overstate the magnitude of losses to foreclosure relative to modications.
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is limited to owner-occupied loans because the public intervention to encourage more
modications was designed to prevent the forfeiture of a family's primary residence,
rather than the loss of an investment property.

The sample is restricted to loans

originated between 2002-2008 because these homes were at the focal point of the
foreclosure crisis. Loans are limited to LTV ratios between 70 - 100 to compare loans
with similar amounts of pre-crisis equity. The sample is limited to FICO credit scores
between 300 and 850, because this is the range of credit scores produced by FICO.
Loans outside of this range represent some type of data error. Similarly, loans are
restricted to those above $30,000, because Grin and Maturana (2016) showed that
loans below this range contained a greater proportion of data errors.
The pooled sample is built by merging the data from the month of December
to provide a retrospective snap shot of the year.

After these restrictions, the full

2006-2014 pooled sample includes 10 million loan-year observations. The sample also
includes roughly 900,000 of the 1.9 million unique foreclosures, and 515,000 of the
900,000 modications. A large portion of foreclosures and modications are typically
dropped from the sample during the year in which they occur, so these dropped
observations are merged back into the December observations.
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics for all loans, current loans, delinquent
loans, foreclosed loans, and modied loans.
these groups tended to be quite similar.

The basic pattern is that loans across

As expected, current loans have slightly

better risk measures than delinquent loans. Somewhat unexpectedly, modied loans
tended to have slightly worse risk measures than other groups.

However, modied

loan's risk measures were still relatively close to those of the other groups.
There were roughly 1.5 million unique loans in the full sample in 2006 and 2007.
For the pooled sample, this yields 10,000,000 loan-year observations with an average
original balance of $275,000.

Throughout the course of 2006-2014, roughly 40% of

loans were delinquent at least once, for a total of 4.3 million delinquent loan-year
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Table 2.1.

Sample Description

Panel A: Loan Information (mean)
Original Balance ($)

All

Current

Delinquent

Foreclosed

Modied
259,552

276,663

282,970

267,957

272,698

Loan-to-Value

82.12

81.72

82.66

82.86

82.98

FICO Score

661.9

677

640.9

645.4

627.6

10,057,406

5,854,415

4,103,753

884,741

513,954

N

Panel B: Distribution of Risk Measures, Loan Type, and Purpose (%)
All

Current

Delinquent

Foreclosed

Modied

FICO Score
Sub Prime

27.4

20.6

36.9

34.3

45.9

Alt-A

21.6

19.5

24.5

25.0

25.1

Prime

51.0

60.0

38.6

41.0

29.0

LTV <= 80

71.0

73.9

67.2

67.1

62.7

80 < LTV <= 95

19.4

17.1

22.6

22.2

26.6

95 <= LTV

9.6

9.0

10.3

10.7

10.7

Fixed Rate

35.7

38.2

32.1

31.1

49.7

Adjustable Rate

62.8

60.6

66.1

66.1

44.9

Loan-to-Value

Loan Type

Loan Purpose
Purchase

47.5

48.1

46.8

48.6

40.2

Renace

13.2

14.3

11.7

11.0

11.0

Cash-out Renance

37.5

35.9

39.6

37.6

46.2
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Delinquent observations in this sample are counted as any loan that

is delinquent at least once in the preceding year. During the full 2006-2014 period,
the sample contains roughly 900,000 unique foreclosures, and 515,000 unique modications.

However, about 140,000 of these modications eventually ended up in

foreclosure.
Panel B shows the distribution of risk measures, types of loans, and purpose of
loans across these groups. As could be expected, risk measures were better for current
loans than delinquent loans. Current loans had a much higher proportion of prime
credit scores, while modied loans had the largest proportion of subprime credit
scores. Current loans also had lower LTVs than delinquent loans. Current loans and
delinquent loans tended to be more similar in terms of loan types and purposes. The
exception is modied loans, which had a largest proportions of xed rate mortgages
and cash-out renances.
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Figure 2.2 provides data on the performance of loans in the sample from 20062014.

4

The gure shows the total balances of loans that are current, delinquent,

foreclosed, and modied. The table shows the level of delinquencies as well as the
distribution of delinquency actions between foreclosures and modications. The basic
pattern in this gure is that delinquencies were quite severe, and tended to result in
more foreclosures than modications.
The total balance of loans in the sample peaked in 2007 at nearly $450 billion,
before rapidly declining due to poor performance. From 2009-2011, the delinquent
balance was roughly the same or slightly greater than the current balance.

The

delinquent balance in these years ranged between $140-$155 billion. The delinquent
balance remained between 85%-65% of the current balance in the remaining years of
the sample.
The gure also shows the distribution of delinquency actions between foreclosures
and modications. The height of the delinquent balance shows the total delinquent
balance, while the area of foreclosed and modied balances shows what portion of
delinquency actions they account for respectively. In all years, the foreclosed balance
was larger than the modied balance. The modied balance peaked at $31 billion in
2010, which was 86% of the foreclosed balance. The modied balance ranged between
50%-60% percent of the foreclosed balance in 2008, 2009, 2011, and 2014, but was
only 36% of the foreclosed balance from 2012-2013.

In addition, typically between

40%-60% of delinquent loans were neither modied nor foreclosed.

2.3.2 Main Results
This section presents the main results for the increase in borrower debt balances
in loan modications from 2008-2014. The presentation of the results begins by de-

4 The full 2006-2014 period is shown here, rather than the 2008-2014 period which forms the basis
for the bulk of the analysis in the next section, to allow the reader to see the pre-crisis period of
2006.
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scribing the total increase in debt for the entire sample period, and total increases per
year. The section then provides greater detail for these aggregate ndings by using
the restricted sample to analyze average increase in debt per modication. This portion also discusses results for whether capitalization in modications is driven by fees
or missed interest payments, and the servicers who are responsible for modications
which reduce debt.

Table 2.2.

Total Losses to Foreclosure and Change in Debt Balance for Sample,

CCF, and Market 2008-2014

Panel A: Total Number of Foreclosures and Modications
Sample

CCF

Foreclosures

847,109

1,707,782

PLS Market
4,868,735

All Modications

513,954

908,486

2,590,405

Redistribution Modications

328,437

565,022

1,644,977

Capitalization

304,448

517,552

1,506,732

Forgiveness

67,673

123,099

357,712

Type of Redistribution
Type of Forgiveness
Principal

27,630

52,817

155,164

Interest

58,526

104,897

304,437

Expense

25,778

46,870

137,446

Panel B: Total Loss to Foreclosures and Change in Debt Balance from Modications
Sample (Millions $)

CCF (Billions $)

PLS Market (Billions $)

121,458

209.9

599.8

Capitalization

7,143

11.4

34.0

Forgiveness

-2,957

-4.7

-14.2

Principal

2,096

3.33

9.92

Interest

545.2

.89

2.66

Expense

316.3

.52

1.58

Loss to Foreclosures

Redistribution Modications

Net

Type of Forgiveness

4,186

6.7

19.8

Table 2.2 presents the main results for total changes in debt balance due to modications, and total losses to foreclosure from 2008-2014. The results are reported for
the restricted sample, and the full CCF. The results from the full CCF are then projected to the level of the entire PLS market based on the CCF's yearly market share.
Panel A presents the cumulative total number of modications and foreclosures for
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the sample and the market. The basic patterns in this panel are that the cumulative
total number of modications with capitalization far outpaced those with forgiveness,
and that foreclosures substantially outpaced modications. For the restricted sample,
the total number of modications with forgiveness was only slightly greater than 20%
of the number of modications with capitalization. There were also almost 75% more
foreclosures than modications in the restricted sample, and 88% more foreclosures
than modications in the full CCF.
At the level of the entire PLS market, the results imply that there were slightly
under 5 million foreclosures. Compared with Corelogic's estimate of 5.7 million total
foreclosures since 2008 this gure is unexpectedly high, even when considering that the
PLS market accounted for the lion's share of foreclosures during the Great Recession

5

and weak recovery.

However, the variable which measures foreclosures in the CCF

includes home forfeiture actions more broadly, rather than just narrow foreclosures.
This factor can likely account for the dierence in estimates.
Panel B presents the main results for total change in debt balances and losses to
foreclosure. This panel presents the primary nding of the paper - that modications
in the PLS market resulted in a cumulative net increase of borrower debt balances

6

by roughly $20 billion dollars from 2008-2014.

The total amount capitalized in

modications in this market was $34 billion, which was over twice as much as the
total amount forgiven of $14.2 billion. The panel also shows that losses to foreclosure
were signicantly larger than total forgiveness.

Roughly $120 billion was lost to

foreclosure in the sample, and $210 billion in the full CCF, from 2008-2014. At the
level of the entire market, this implies that total losses to foreclosure for this period

5 Corelogic is a leading data provider which constructs widely used foreclosure reports.

reports can be found here:
http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/researchtrends/
national-foreclosure-report.aspx?WT.mc_id=prnw_160510_IrWNB#.V1dDVJErKhc.

The

6 As described in the data description section, November 2008 is the rst month for which the
CCF recorded dierent measures of redistribution in modications. This makes 2009 the rst year
for which we have complete data for redistribution in modications.
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were almost $600 billion. This level of loss is equal to 22% of the December 2007 peak
outstanding balance for the entire PLS market of $2.7 trillion. The large amount of
losses to foreclosure relative to total debt forgiven suggests that substantially more
forgiveness could have occurred to prevent losses to foreclosure.
The remainder of the results in this section are all based on the restricted sample.
Figure 2.3 presents greater detail for the results in Table 2.2 by showing the total net
change in debt balances from modications per year. The main nding in this gure
is that there was a larger increase in debt balances in 2014 than in any other year,
with the exception of the peak crisis year of 2010. This ndng extends the existing
literature, because it shows that the increase in debt identied in COP (2010) and
White (2008) became larger through time. The peak year for total increase in debt
balances was 2010, where roughly $1.3 billion was added to borrower debt balances.

68

Total Forgiveness and Capitalization in Modications

-500
-1,500

-1,000

Millions ($)

0

500

1,000

Figure 2.4.

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Year
Forgiveness

Capitalization

Over the course of the next two years, the total amount added to debt balances due
to modications decreased. The lowest total amount added to debt balances occurred
in 2012, when debt balances were only increased by $288 million. However, following
2012 the total amount added to debt balances grew each year. In the nal year of
the sample, modications added $834 million to borrower debt balances.
Figure 2.4 presents total forgiveness and capitalization per year. This gure helps
to show whether changes in the total net increase in debt balances presented in Figure
2.3 were driven by forgiveness or capitalization. Variation in the total net change in
borrower debt balances seems to be driven more by variation in forgiveness than
capitalization.

Total amounts capitalized peaked at over $1.5 billion in 2010, and

then remained fairly consistent at slightly over $1 billion per year for the remainder
of the sample period. In contrast, total forgiveness was quite low until 2011, when it
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reached roughly $500 million. Total forgiveness peaked in 2012 at almost $800 million,
before returning to pre-2011 levels in 2014. The total amount of capitalization was
relatively constant from 2011-2014, so variation in total net change in debt balances
was driven largely by the increase and decrease in total forgiveness.

A probable

explanation for this pattern is that 2012 was the nal year of the primary portion
of the HAMP program.

To be sure, HAMP was extended beyond 2012.

However

HAMP modications accounted for a much smaller portion of total modications in

7

the PLS market after 2012.

As the HAMP program wound down, the results suggest

that forgiveness in modications also decreased.

7 For reference, see the quarterly OCC Mortgage Metrics reports from 2013-2014.
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Figure 2.5 compares total losses to foreclosure with the total amount of forgiveness
per year. The total amount of forgiveness here is gross forgiveness, not net, because
modications resulted in net increases in debt balances in every year. The basic pattern shown in this gure is that losses to foreclosure were several orders of magnitude
larger than gross forgiveness, which suggests that there was ample room for increasing forgiveness. Indeed, losses to foreclosure per year in the sample are most usefully
measured in the tens of billions of dollars, while total forgiveness is more usefully
measured in the hundreds of millions. Losses to foreclosure peaked at close to $30
billion in 2009, and remained close to $20 billion for the next 3 years. In contrast,
gross forgiveness was not larger than $800 million in any year. At $30 billion, losses
to foreclosure in the peak year were roughly ten times larger than the combined total
forgiveness for all years in the sample, which was just under $3 billion. Considering
the large losses to foreclosure, forgiveness could have been far more generous.
Table 2.3 helps to provide more detail for the cumulative totals shown in Table 2.2
by reporting the total number of modications and foreclosures, and mean change in
debt balance due to modications, per year from 2008-2014. Panel A provides counts
of modications, types of modications, and foreclosures per year. The total number
of modications are reported, as well as the number of modications that resulted in
some change in borrower debt balances. Panel A also reports whether the modication
included capitalization or forgiveness, and type of forgiveness. The dierence between
all modications and redistribution modications are the modications which did not
result in net change debt balances. It is likely that these modications only included
repayment plans. November 2008 was the rst month in which information for redistribution in modication was recorded in the CCF, which explains why redistribution
modications was so low in 2008. Many modications included some combination of
both capitalization and forgiveness.
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Table 2.3.

Total Number of Modications, Foreclosures, and Mean Change in Debt

Balance

Panel A: Total Number of Modications and Foreclosures ($)
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

140,008

180,000

128,905

121,257

115,679

106,803

54,457

83,061

104,933

110,581

74,878

51,261

46,873

35,569

9,446

57,893

82,891

59,104

44,653

41,966

32,484

Capitalization

8,443

54,543

80,320

53,130

38,753

38,169

31,090

Forgiveness

2,428

12,943

10,975

14,565

13,252

8,790

4,720

1,981

Foreclosures
All Mods
Redistribution Mods

Type of Redistribution
Type of Forgiveness
Principal

902

3,366

2,852

6,197

7,113

5,219

Interest

2,036

11,405

9,691

13,129

11,511

6,772

3,982

Expense

1,132

3,335

2,578

6,448

6,703

3,856

1,726

Panel B: Mean Loss to Foreclosuse and Change in Debt Balance ($)
Loss to Foreclosure

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

111,388

162,243

154,099

153,911

158,793

127,582

122,528

36,232

Redistribution Modications
Capitalization

12,219

13,268

19,743

23,386

28,038

33,396

Forgiveness

24,758

20,832

23,849

39,296

60,264

79,934

Net

-4,558

-7,843

-15,973

-11,339

Principal

46,182

55,257

66,917

Interest

6,729

5,917

5,454

Expense

4,201

4,842

6,997

Type of Forgiveness

61,921

-6,449

-13,632

-25,680

71,332

80,412

95,142

84,191

6,578

12,079

17,109

17,542

6,813

13,071

23,395

32,231

Panel C: Mean Loss to Foreclosure and Change in Debt Balance (%)
Loss to Foreclosure

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

46.3

61.6

57.0

57.3

57.6

45.1

46.5

14.6

Redistribution Modications
Capitalization
Forgiveness

Net

5.6

5.7

7.1

9.2

13.0

14.7

13.6

9.0

10.1

16.4

21.9

25.2

18.3

-1.5

-3.3

-5.6

-4.6

-5.1

-8.1

-11.3

Principal

26.3

25.1

31.4

35.1

35.5

37.1

32.0

Interest

3.5

2.8

2.5

4.1

7.0

8.2

7.1

Expense

2.5

2.6

4.0

5.1

8.4

11.7

14.1

Type of Forgiveness

72

There are three basic patterns in Panel A. First, most modications increased
debt through capitalization. In contrast, modications which included any form of
forgiveness were quite rare. The ratio of modications which included capitalization
to those which included forgiveness ranged from roughly a high of 8:1 to a low of 3:1.
Even in the years in which forgiveness was most common relative to capitalization,
three times as much capitalization occurred. The second basic pattern is that forgiveness tended to occur through forgiveness of interest, but not principal or expenses. In
the peak crisis years of 2009-2010, interest forgiveness occurred almost twice as often
as the combined total of expense and principal forgiveness. Finally, the third basic
pattern is that foreclosures outpaced modications in all years, which can also be seen
in Figure 2.2. The biggest dierence between foreclosures and modications occurred
in 2012-2013, when there were over twice as many foreclosures as modications.
Panels B and C show the mean loss to foreclosure and change in debt balances
in dollars and as a percentage. These panels also show three basic patterns. First,
foreclosures were extremely costly.

The average loss to foreclosure ranged between

roughly $110,000-$160,000, which was between 45%-62% of the original balance of
the loan. The large costs to foreclosure suggest that there was ample room for more
forgiveness to reduce loss severity.

Second, principal forgiveness was much more

generous than any other form of forgivness, for the few loans that received it. Principal
forgiveness was over 30% of the current loan balance from 2010-2014, and peaked at
almost $100,000 in 2013. However, even at its peak, principal forgiveness per loan
was still less than the lowest amount of losses to foreclosure per loan. This suggests
that losses to foreclosure were high enough to create substantial room for much more
widespread principal forgiveness.
The third basic pattern, which is also the second primary nding of this paper, is
that the average net increase in debt balance per modication grew from 2008-2014.
The average net increase in debt balances per modication was only 1.3% in 2008, but
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grew substantially to 11.3% in 2014. Average capitalization and forgiveness per loan
both grew throughout the sample period. However, forgiveness was far less common as
only 5% of total modications resulted in net forgiveness. Therefore, the net increase
in loan balances grew through time. Average capitalization per loan roughly tripled
throughout the sample period, from $12,000 in 2008 to $36,000 in 2014. This increase
was from roughly 5.5% to 15% of the current loan balance. Average forgiveness per
loan also increased substantially during the sample period, peaking in 2013 at close to
$80,000 or 25% of the loan balance. Average forgiveness tended to be far larger than
average capitalization, however far fewer loans received forgiveness.

Therefore the

average net change in debt balance was substantially negative in all years. Reecting
the increase in capitalization, the net increase in loan balance was largest in the nal
two years of the sample at between 8%-11% of loan balance, or $13,000-$25,000.
The third pattern in this table also extends the earlier ndings of COP (2010)
and White (2008) by showing that the problems they identied grew worse through
time. Consistent with COP (2010) and White (2008), only 5% of total modications
in my sample reduced borrower debt balances, and 2010 modications increased debt
balances by roughly 5%.

However, by the nal year of the sample, modications

increased borrower debt balances by an average of 11.3%, which is twice as large as
found in COP (2010) and White (2008).
The nal primary nding of this paper is that the increase in average net debt
added per modication from 2010-2014 identied in Table 2.3 is consistent with
agency problems associated with servicers cost-plus compensation structure, because
the increase cannot be explained by a greater severity of delinquency in the later
years. Table 2.4 below provides results supporting this interpretation by presenting
mean amount of capitalization per delinquency, as well as average delinquencies for
all modications, modications with high amounts of capitalization, and modications with low amounts of capitalization. High and low amounts of capitalization are
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dened as modications in the highest and lowest quartiles of capitalization amounts
as a share of the outstanding loan balance.

8

The main nding in this table is that

average capitalization per delinquency in modications grew through time. This pattern is consistent with larger fees imposed by servicers, but not a greater number of
missed interest payments.

Table 2.4.

Mean Capitalization Per Delinquency

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Capitalization/Delinquency ($)

950.6

1,291

1,761

1,912

2,472

2,995

Low Capitalization

4.1

4.3

All Modications

5.0

5.6

High Capitalization

10.4

10.3

3,488

6.4

6.6

6.3

6.6

6.3

8.1

8.3

8.1

8.6

8.6

10.8

10.7

10.5

10.6

10.4

Mean Delinquency Per Modication

In Table 2.4, average delinquency per modied loan remained constant from 20102014, at close to 8 delinquencies during the previous year.

Therefore, the average

number of missed interest payments per loan modication was constant during these
years.

The average modication had 8 missed interest payments.

This pattern is

consistent if we divide modications into high and low capitalization modications.
The average number of delinquencies per high and low capitalization modications
were also constant from 2010-2014, at 6 and 10 delinquencies respectively.
This nding implies that variation in the number of delinquencies can explain
some of the cross-sectional variation in total amount capitalized per loan in a given
year, but not time-series variation in the increase in capitalization per modication
from 2008-2014. Therefore the mean amount capitalized per delinquency increased
substantially through time. Mean capitalization per delinquency more than tripled
during the sample period, growing from $950.60 in 2008 to $3,488 in 2014. The nding

8 The lowest capitalization quartile is modications which resulted in capitalization less than or
equal to 3.2% of the outstanding balance of the loan. The highest quartile includes modications
that resulted in capitalization greater than or equal to 11.5% of the outstanding balance of the loan.
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of increased capitalization per delinquency is consistent with reports that many of
these modications were designed to redefault to allow servicers to gain lucrative
foreclosure fees (Thompson, 2011; COP, 2009). This interpretation is also consistent
with the high redefault rate for the last three years of the sample, where over half
of the modications redefaulted within the rst year. Increased fee revenue in later
years is also consistent with the winding down of the HAMP program, because the

9

HAMP program prohibited the capitalization of late fees.

The nding that the increased capitalization in later years represents increased fees
charged by servicers, but not increased missed interest payments, also implies that
a large portion of the increase in debt balances can be unambiguously interpreted
as increasing total debt obligations for the borrower. As discussed in the literature
review, whether capitalizing missed interest payments should be interpreted as increasing total borrower debt obligations is ambiguous. However, this issue does not
aect the interpretation of the ndings in this paper, because the increases in capitalization amounts are driven by increases in servicer fees, not missed interest payments.
Therefore, a large portion of the increase in debt balances found in this paper can
be unambiguously interpreted as increasing total borrower debt obligations through
punitive fees.
Overall, roughly 75% of these modications did reduce borrower monthly payments and so provided some relief, even if increasing total borrower debt obligations.
However, increasing debt balances still had negative eects because it reduced the
stimulative power of debt restructuring. Even more signicant considering the high
redefault rate is that increasing the borrowers negative equity guaranteed that re-

9 The HAMP program prohibited the capitalization of late fees, but not all fees. The HAMP
program allowed servicers to capitalize advances made to third parties. However, many of the third
parties were in fact aliated with the servicer, and servicers often received a percentage of the
advances made to these aliates (Thompson, 2011). This practice was one practice which formed
the basis for CFPB enforcement actions, such as the one concerning Ocwen described below.
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defaults would result in costly foreclosure. Had sucient principal been forgiven to
eliminate negative equity, the borrower would have been able to sell the home and
avoid foreclosure if they were still unable to remain current on their mortgage after
modication. Avoiding these foreclosures would have avoided unnecessary destruction
of wealth for borrowers, lenders, and the neighborhoods in which these foreclosures
occurred.
A nal nding is that the modications which reduced borrower indebtedness were
tightly limited to a small subset of servicers.

Just three servicers account for over

80% of modications which reduced borrower debt balances: Ocwen (61%), Litton
(13%), and Bank of America (7.5%). Of these, Ocwen alone accounts for over half
of modications that resulted in net debt forgiveness. Ocwen also engaged in more
modication activity than other servicers.

Ocwen serviced just 12% of total loans

and 14% of delinquent loans, but provided 25% of modications.

Ocwen is one of

the largest mortgage servicing companies in the country. It was the fourth largest in
2010, before a series of acquisitions made it the largest single servicer in 2013. One
of these acquisitions was Litton in 2011, and so Ocwen accounts for an even larger

10

share of modications that reduced debt.

That Ocwen accounted for such a large portion of modications which reduced
debt is somewhat surprising because of Ocwen's documented history of consumer
protection abuses in loan servicing. The largest single complaint against Ocwen was
issued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and attorney generals from 49 states, and settled for $2 billion in December 2013.

CFPB director,

Richard Cordray, stated that, Ocwen took advantage of borrowers at every stage
of the process.

10 Further

The complaint documented that Ocwen took advantage of home-

details

about

the

purchase

of

Litton

can

be

found

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-06-06/
goldman-sachs-agrees-to-sell-litton-unit-to-ocwen-for-264-million-in-cash Accessed
here:

June 7th, 2016.
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owners with servicing shortcuts and unauthorized fees, deceived consumers about
foreclosure alternatives and improperly denied loan modications, and engaged in
illegal foreclosure practices.

11

While it was surprising that Ocwen accounted for a

large portion of the loan modications that reduced debt, the ndings in this dataset
are also consistent with these consumer protection complaints. Ocwen also accounted
for a large proportion of the modications that increased debt the most, and these
modications were far more frequent than those that reduced debt. Ocwen accounted
for 35% of modications in the top 25th percentile of the largest increase in borrower
debt balances. Wells Fargo was the only other servicer which accounted for over 10%
of modications with high increases in debt balances, at 12%.

2.4 Conclusion
The primary results in this paper show that voluntary household debt restructuring through loan modications in the PLS market increased borrower debt balances
rather than reduced them. From 2008-2014, loan modications added $20 billion to
borrower debt balances. The net increase in debt per modications also grew larger
through time, roughly doubling from 2010-2014. This resulted in the net increase in
debt in 2014 being larger than in any other year of the sample, with the exception of
the peak crisis year of 2010, despite having fewer modications than other years. The
increase in net debt added per modication is also consistent with increased fees imposed by servicers, but not by increased numbers of missed interest payments, because
missed interest payments per modication remained constant from 2010-2014.

11 A

description

of

the

complaint

and

settlement

can

be

http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/
cfpb-state-authorities-order-ocwen-to-provide-2-billion-in-relief-to-homeowners-for-servicing-w
The full text of the settlement can be found here: http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_
cfpb_consent-order_ocwen.pdf Accessed June 6th, 2016.

found

here:
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The results in this paper are also consistent with a principal-agent problem between servicers and investors, based on the perverse incentives in servicer's cost-plus
compensation structure. Servicers were incentivized to foreclose rather than modify,
or to provide unsustainable mortgages that increased borrowers debt. This market
failure resulted in the unnecessary destruction of wealth for borrowers, investors, and
the communities in which these foreclosures occurred. Better loss mitigation likely
would have prevented a signicant portion of the 5 million foreclosures, which resulted
in $600 billion lost, in the PLS market from 2008-2014.
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CHAPTER 3
A NEW PUBLIC OPTION FOR HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL
SERVICES
The goal of this paper is to draw lessons from the history of housing nance
regulation in the U.S. to advance a new proposal for reform.

This paper proposes

that the U.S. federal government should create a new public option in housing nance,
which includes two components. First, the government should create a public bank
which directly provides households with basic payment services, small dollar loans,
and mortgages. Second, the government should manage an online nancial services
marketplace.
This paper proposes the creation of a new public option because it would provide the government with regulatory tools to prevent consumer protection abuses
based on asymmetric information, such as unstable mortgages that concentrate risk
on households, as well as increase access to nancial services for those who currently
lack it. The direct provision of services would help to regulate by enforcing a quality
oor through competition from below, which would make risky terms in mortgages
uncompetitive. This would also give government the power to directly provide mortgages with stable terms, rather than relying on prohibiting mortgages with the most
risky terms. Managing an online nancial services marketplace would also prevent
consumer protection abuses such as deceptive practices, hidden fees, or risky terms by
increasing transparency with consumer protection ratings, product standardization,
and consumer reviews. This would directly regulate products sold in the online public market, but also indirectly regulate products sold in the broader private market
through competition.
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This new public option would build o of the strengths of the New Deal housing
nance regulatory structure, while addressing a key weakness that rendered this structure vulnerable to erosion through time. This proposal builds o of the strengths of
the New Deal regulatory structure which heavily relied on public options as a method
of regulation to prevent unstable mortgages and increase access to nancial services.
The public option as a method of regulation is dened as the use of public institutions
to regulate the market through active participation and direct competition with private intermediaries. The paper will describe how these public institutions were able
to increase access to nancial services by transforming existing intermediaries into
the functional equivalent of a heavily regulated public utility whose mission was to
provide aordable mortgage credit to households in the communities it was located
in. This paper will also describe how these public institutions were able to address
the problem of unstable mortgages by setting the terms of how mortgages distributed
risk to protect borrowers. These institutions accomplished this by making mortgages
with stable terms more competitive than mortgages without these terms by providing these mortgages access to Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insurance and
secondary market liquidity. For example, the government insured credit risk in mortgages through the FHA. However, mortgages were only eligible for this insurance if
they had terms that shielded borrowers from risk such as long repayment terms, xed
interest rates, and full amortization. Public institutions were thus able to indirectly
set the terms of mortgage origination in the primary market to protect borrowers by
limiting access to the services they provided in the insurance and secondary market
(Levitin and Wachter, 2013).
This paper also argues that the lack of a public option in the primary market was a
key weakness of the New Deal regulatory structure that rendered it vulnerable to erosion through time. I argue this was a weakness because the eectiveness of indirectly
setting the terms of the primary market through limiting access to the insurance and
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secondary markets depended on narrowly restricting the activities of primary market
intermediaries through regulations from above. However, these restrictions were vulnerable to erosion. I will describe how these restrictions were vulnerable to erosion
through time because they were too rigid to adapt to adverse market conditions, such
as the high ination and interest rates of the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s.
I will also describe how the declining eectiveness of the ability to regulate using
public options following deregulation in the 1980s allowed the reemergence of unstable mortgages which concentrated risk on households who lacked alternative sources
of stable mortgage credit. The resulting defaults in these mortgages contributed to
the largest nancial crisis since the Great Depression.

The proposal in this paper

describes how direct public participation in the primary market would provide tools
to prevent the reemergence of unstable mortgages and lack of access, resulting in a
regulatory structure that would be more resistant to erosion through time.
The proposal for a public bank in this paper is also related to, but distinct from,
proposals for postal banking from the United States Postal Service Oce of the
Inspector General (USPS OIG) (USPS, 2015, 2014). The USPS OIG has proposed
that post oces provide basic nancial services such as deposit, bill pay, check cashing,
and small loans to households that lack access to traditional nancial services. The
lynchpin postal banking product would be a reloadable, pre-paid postal debit card.
The public bank in this paper would also provide these basic services.
there are several key dierences.

However,

First, it would provide a much wider range of

services such as mortgages, and possibly any other government guaranteed loan such
as Small Business Administration (SBA) loans.

Second, I argue that the public

bank should directly compete with private institutions as a method to regulate them.
Finally, another key dierence is that I propose that this bank be constituted as
an independent agency with independent nances from the USPS. The main role of
this agency would be to improve the function of regulation, rather than to provide

82

revenue for the USPS. That being said, I think it would still be advisable to work
with the USPS to take advantage of its large geographic post oce branch network.
This public bank could also generate revenue for the USPS, by renting space in postal
branches and providing services for the USPS to sell. However, revenue generation
would not be its primary function.
The remainder of this paper is organized into three sections. Section 1 describes
the New Deal solution to lack of access and unstable mortgage structures through the
creation of public options in housing nance. Section 2 describes weaknesses in the
New Deal regulatory structure which rendered it vulnerable to erosion through time.
The nal section describes the details of the proposal for a new public option.

3.1 New Deal Solutions for Unstable Housing Finance
The purpose of this section is to describe how the New Deal reforms addressed the
housing nance problems of unstable mortgage structures and lack of access through
the creation of public options. To do so, this section begins by describing unstable
mortgages and lack of access in the pre-New Deal era.

The section then describes

how the New Deal interventions during the Great Depression created a diverse array of public institutions that actively participated in the market. This section will
describe how these institutions improved access to mortgage credit through transforming depository institutions, particularly thrifts, into the functional equivalent
of a heavily regulated public utility that would provide aordable mortgage credit
to households.

The section then describes how the Homeowner Loan Corporation

(HOLC) created stable mortgages that shielded borrowers from risk through the necessity of restructuring the existing unstable mortgages that had defaulted.

These

new stable mortgages also improved access by including terms, such as longer terms
and higher loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, that made them aordable to a larger share
of households. Finally, the section will also describe how the government was able to
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indirectly regulate the terms of mortgage origination in the primary market through
limiting access to FHA insurance and the secondary market.

3.1.1 Lack of Access and Unstable Mortgages in pre-New Deal Housing
Finance
Lack of access to basic nancial services for low to moderate income classes was a
persistent feature of unregulated U.S. nancial markets before the New Deal. Prior
to the New Deal era, roughly one-third of counties lacked access to a provider of
mortgage credit (FHLBB, 1983). Additionally, a large portion of families could not
access mortgage credit due to the terms of the mortgages. Maximum LTV ratios were
typically capped at 50 percent. Therefore, a family would require a 50 percent down
payment to obtain a mortgage. Lack of access contributed to the homeownership rate
being much lower than modern levels. The homeownership rate at the turn of the
century was roughly 40 percent, compared to modern levels of between 60-70 percent
in the latter portion of the twentieth century (Snowden, 2009).
Expansion of access to nancial services was a central demand in widespread calls
for reform from historical social movements such as the populists in the late 19th century, the progressives in the early 20th century, and the labor movement throughout
this period.

Widespread lack of access was also a main driving force behind early

proposals for postal banking in the U.S. and Europe. These calls advocated for the
post oce to provide safe deposit services and credit to households who lacked access.
For example, the Populist Party's 1892 platform stated that, We demand that postal
savings banks be established by the government for the safe deposit of the earnings
of the people and to facilitate exchange, (Baradaran, 2015).
When households were able to access mortgage credit in the pre-New Deal era,
the structure of mortgages was unstable because it concentrated risk on households.
These loans typically had terms of 3-5 years, but were not fully-amortizing.
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They

were named bullet mortgages because they required a large bullet payment at
the end the loan term.

Borrowers typically depended on the extension of a new

mortgage at the end of the loan to prevent foreclosure (Levitin and Wachter, 2013).
This structure concentrated interest rate, liquidity, and market risk on households.
These mortgages concentrated interest rate risk on households because if interest
rates increased during the loan term, households would only be able to obtain a new
mortgage at the higher interest rate. These mortgages concentrated liquidity risk on
households because households had to bear the risk that a new mortgage would not
be available at the end of the loan term. Finally, the households had to bear market
risk also, because they would bear the rst losses if the value of their home declined.
Bullet loans are also consistent with what Hyman Minsky described as nancially
fragile ponzi or speculative structures (Minsky, 2008).

These structures are fragile

because of the dependence on external nance for solvency. Minsky provided a threepart taxonomy of hedge, speculative, and ponzi nancial positions. This taxonomy
is based on the relation between the operating income and debt service payments
of borrowers. A rm or household is in a hedge nancial position when the anticipated operating income is sucient to cover both interest payments and scheduled
reductions in indebtedness.

A rm or household is in a speculative position when

anticipated operating income is sucient to cover interest payments, but not sucient to cover the amounts due on maturing loans. This is more fragile than a hedge
position because the agent must rely on external nancing, for example in the form of
new loans, to repay part or all of the amount due on maturing loans. Finally, a rm
or household is in a ponzi position when anticipated operating income is insucient
to even cover interest payments. This is the most fragile position because the rm
must rely on external nancing to even meet interest commitments (Kindleberger,
1978).
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3.1.2 New Deal Crisis Intervention and the Creation of Public Options
The unstable mortgages described in the previous section experienced a large wave
of defaults during the Great Depression. From 1931-1935, there were roughly 250,000
foreclosures per year (Green and Wachter, 2005). At the height of the Depression in
1933, roughly half of homes were in default, and 10 percent of homes in foreclosure
(Levitin and Wachter, 2013). These defaults were particularly onerous for savings and
loans (S&Ls) institutions, because their portfolio was highly concentrated in mortgages. From 1930-1934, the foreclosure rate on mortgages, measured as a share of the
total dollar value of loans outstanding, was approximately 14 percent. This caused
the failure of a large portion of S&Ls. From 1931-1933, the size of the S&L industry contracted by 25 percent. The industry contracted another 15 percent between
1933-1939 (FHLBB, 1983).

The large number of foreclosures and failing nancial

institutions prompted widespread calls for government intervention.
Levitin and Wachter, who are legal historians of housing nance regulation, present
a detailed case study of how the use of public options as regulatory tools in housing nance emerged in an ad hoc manner to respond to the crisis of the Great Depression.
The description of the use of public options in this section will draw heavily from
their account, and focus on how public options were used to address the problems of
lack of access and unstable mortgages. They dene the public option as a mode of
regulation as the use of public institutions to regulate the market through competing
with private institutions and directly providing goods and services. The remainder of
this section will describe how public options in housing nance regulated the market
in two ways. First, they provided services to private intermediaries, but used the provision of these services to regulate the private intermediaries. For example, the FHA
provided a service to intermediaries by insuring credit risk on mortgages. However,
the FHA used this insurance as a regulatory tool by limiting access to insurance to
mortgages with stable terms. Second, public institutions, in particular the HOLC,
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used the direct provision of services to household to also create durable trends which
set the terms of the market. For example, the HOLC set the terms of how mortgages
distributed risk to shield borrowers by creating the xed interest rate, long repayment
term, fully amortizing mortgage (Levitin and Wachter, 2013).
The creation of public institutions was initially intended to serve as temporary
stop-gap measures until private nancial markets could be revived. However, these
institutions ended up operating far longer than was anticipated.
these public institutions occurred in two waves.

The creation of

First, the government created the

Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system, the Federal Savings and Loans Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). When
these proved insucient to revive the market on their own, the government then
created the second group of institutions, which include the HOLC, FHA insurance,
and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). In the remainder of
this section, I will describe in more detail how these institutions solved the problems
of lack of access and unstable mortgages (Levitin and Wachter, 2013).

3.1.2.1 The FHLBs, FSLIC, and FDIC
The rst set of institutions created was the FHLBs, FDIC, and FSLIC. These initial institutions helped to improve access to nancial services through transforming
depository institutions, particularly thrifts, into the functional equivalent of a heavily
regulated public utility for providing mortgage credit. The New Deal reforms established the FHLBs, which were modeled after the Federal Reserve system and governed
by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). The FHLBB was given the power
to charter federal savings and loans associations. These charters granted S&Ls access to services that stabilized their funding, such as liquidity provided by the FHLB
system through discounting mortgages, and deposit insurance through the FSLIC.
However, these charters also served a regulatory function by restructuring existing
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S&Ls into a specialized intermediary for providing mortgage credit through imposing
substantial restrictions on permissible activities and portfolio strategies.

These in-

cluded restrictions on lines of business, branching, types of assets that could be held
and in what amounts, lending beyond a specied distance from the thrift institution,
the amount of loan that could be lent to a single entity, and prohibited adjustable rate
lending. Essentially, these restrictions created a narrow business model where thrifts
would originate mortgages and hold them in their portfolio (Levitin and Wachter,
2013; D'Arista, 1994).
The New Deal reforms essentially envisioned the role of thrifts as similar to a heavily regulated public utility whose public mission was to provide access to aordable
mortgage credit for the communities in which they were located. These public utilities
were also designed to provide fair access to aordable credit for all communities, at
all income levels. The branching restrictions, geographic restrictions on lending, and
restrictions on interstate banking can be understood in this context. These restrictions were put in place due to fears that interstate branch banking would undermine
fair access to credit by channeling deposits out of low-income rural communities and
into nancial centers such as New York (D'Arista, 1994).
The FDIC also provided commercial banks deposit insurance which helped stabilize their funding. However, deposit insurance was also used as a regulatory tool
to promote the reduce risk at commercial banks.

For example, acces to deposit

insurance required commerical banks to submit to direct monitoring through bank
examinations. This were necessary to prevent moral hazard due to deposit insurance.
While depository insurance stabilized deposits, it also removed the market incentive
for depositors to monitor the risk activities of insured institutions.

Therefore, the

FDIC needed to directly monitor risk (Levitin and Wachter, 2013; D'Arista, 1994).
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3.1.2.2 The HOLC
The creation of stable mortgage structures occurred through the need to address
the large number of foreclosures caused by the existing unstable mortgage structures.
As described above, at the height of the Great Depression in 1933, roughly one-half
of the mortgages in the country were in default, and 10 percent were in foreclosure.
To address this crisis, the federal government directly entered into the mortgage
market through the creation of the HOLC. The HOLC bought up defaulted mortgages
and restructured them into more stable mortgages on a large scale. The new stable
mortgage terms pioneered by the HOLC included xed-interest rates, long payment
terms, and full amortization. In its rst year, the HOLC received applications from
40 percent of all mortgage holders, and renanced half of them. After the HOLC's
rst year, the federal government was the country's largest single mortgagor, holding
and servicing slightly over 10 percent of all residential mortgages in the country.
The program was also quite successful at crisis mitigation, preventing default and
foreclosure by signicantly lowering monthly payments for borrowers. Additionally,
lenders were happy to receive much needed liquidity and to remove non-performing
loans from their balance sheets (Levitin and Wachter, 2013).
The signicance of the HOLC for the public option is that it showcased the power
of the government to use the direct provision of services to households in the primary
market to shield borrowers from risk. In setting the new terms of the mortgages to
improve stability, the government needed to redistribute the bundle of risks inherent to
the structure of mortgages. The new mortgages were stable because they redistributed
liquidity and interest risk away from households and towards nancial intermediaries,
who more robust tools to manage these risks.

For example, the long-term, fully-

amortizing structure removed liquidity risk from households because it did not require
the extension of a new mortgage at the end of the loan term. Financial intermediaries
would now have to bear greater liquidity risk than under the older mortgage structure
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with a 3-5 year term. However, they would also have more tools to manage this risk
than households, because they had access to liquidity from the FHLBs and Federal
Reserve, as well as deposit insurance. Additionally, the xed-rate shielded households
from interest rate risk, leaving them with stable monthly payments they could budget
around. However, depository institutions would now have to bear this risk. As will
be described below, the tools they had to bear this risk were insucient to deal with
the high ination and interest rates of the late 1960s and 1970s. It was only with the
growth of securitization in the 1990s that they would have adequate tools to manage
interest rate risk. Finally, the new mortgage structure did not shield households from
market risk, because they still bore rst losses from house price declines (Levitin and
Wachter, 2013; D'Arista, 1994; Mian and Su, 2014).
The new mortgages were also more accessible due to the long-terms and higher
allowable LTV ratios. The long-terms lowered monthly payments to a level that was
aordable for a much larger share of households. Additionally, the higher allowable
LTVs of up to 80 percent, compared to the 33-50 percent before, made the mortgages
more accessible by lowering the required down payment.

The HOLC also helped

this mortgage set the trend by proving the feasibility of this radical innovation on
a large scale, and then standardizing it. The HOLC standardized this mortgage by
creating a basic template for origination, servicing, and foreclosure, which allowed for
widespread adoption by private intermediaries. Standardization was also a necessary
condition for sale in the secondary market, because investors were typically unwilling
to assume the credit risk inherent in non-standard products (Levitin and Wachter,
2013).

3.1.2.3 FHA Insurance, Fannie Mae, and the Secondary Market
While the entrance of the HOLC into the mortgage market made the federal government the single largest mortgagor in the country, the federal government was not
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interested in actually holding these mortgages. The government was not interested
in managing the credit and interest rate risk in these mortgages, or having to conduct foreclosures on delinquent mortgages. Therefore, the government wanted to sell
these loans back to the private market.

However, at this time there was no func-

tional secondary market for mortgages. Creating the secondary market required the
government to assume credit risk through FHA insurance, and to create Fannie Mae
to sell FHA insured loans in the secondary market. This was signicant for regulation because the provision of mortgage insurance and secondary market funding to
intermediaries was used as a tool to indirectly regulate the terms of mortgages in
the primary market, as will be described below. Additionally, it was also a necessary
condition for the widespread adoption of the new mortgage structure. (Levitin and
Wachter, 2013).
The government needed to assume credit risk to create the secondary market
because investors were still wary due to the Great Depression. FHA insurance accomplished this goal, but more signicantly also served as a tool to regulate the
primary market. FHA insurance was able to indirectly set the terms of the primary
market by limiting access to mortgage insurance to loans that conformed to the new
structure created by the HOLC. Initially, the FHA required mortgages to have xed
interest rates up to 5 percent, long terms up to 20 years, and LTVs up to 80 percent.
However, in 1937 this was increased to 30 year terms with LTVs as high as 97 percent
(Levitin and Wachter, 2013).
Limiting access to insurance to mortgages that met these stable terms served as a
tool to regulate mortgage terms in the primary market by making stable mortgages
more competitive. From the perspective of the intermediary, insured loans were more
desirable because they could be sold in the secondary market and hence had greater
liquidity. Insurance also indirectly regulated uninsured loans through competition by
creating a quality oor. Uninsured loans needed to have comparable terms to insured
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loans in order to be desirable to borrowers. Indirectly regulating the primary market
by limiting access to FHA insurance and the secondary market became one of the
main regulatory mechanisms of housing nance in the latter half of the twentieth
century (Levitin and Wachter, 2013).
Once the federal government had assumed credit risk through mortgage insurance,
the loans could then be sold back to private institutions through the secondary market.
However, the government needed an institution to manage the sales of loans and
securities on the secondary market. The government accomplished this by creating
Fannie Mae to purchase FHA insured loans, and sell long-term bonds based on the
underlying cash ows. Moreover, Fannie Mae was willing to purchase any government
insured loan at par, and so increased market liquidity for insured loans even when it
did not directly buy them. While the secondary mortgage market did not experience
rapid growth until the 1980s, it was still important in this time period because it
increased market liquidity. Moreover, the creation of the secondary market helped to
further cement the trend of the mortgage structure pioneered by the HOLC as the
dominant U.S. mortgage structure (Levitin and Wachter, 2013).

3.1.2.4 Successes and Limitations
While dating institutional systems is necessarily arbitrary to some degree, the
regulatory structure put in place by the New Deal reforms only fully solidied after
World War II with the Treasury-Fed Accord of 1951. Before this, public eorts were
either concentrated on direct crisis intervention in the depression, or on nancing the

1

war.

The public institutions that regulated intermediaries through providing them

services, such as liquidity and insurance, proved to be long-lasting. However, direct
public participation in the primary market was always seen as temporary.

As the

1 During the war, depository institutions were essentially turned into government bond holding
companies. However, this also had the eect of lling the nancial system with safe, liquid assets
which reduced nancial fragility (Minsky, 2008).
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HOLC wound down operations in 1951, so too did the government's participation in
the primary market. As the government retreated from direct provision of credit in
the primary market, it left the private intermediaries with stable mortgage products
to provide to households, as well as the robust secondary market infrastructure to
support these mortgages.
The regulatory structure for housing nance during this period was remarkably
successful at increasing homeownership and preventing nancial crises. The institutions specialized to solely provide mortgage credit, thrift institutions, grew rapidly
following World War II, with assets increasing 900 percent between 1945-1960. Thrifts
provided roughly half of mortgage credit during this time period, and commercial
banks also provided roughly one-third. Homeownership increased dramatically in the
postwar period. The homeownership rate was roughly 40 percent at the turn of the
century, and remained relatively constant until declining slightly during the Great
Depression. However, following the New Deal reforms and the end of World War II,
the homeownership rate increased from 44 percent in 1940 to over 65 percent in 1970.
Considering the previous unstable structure of housing nance, it is an impressive
accomplishment that this structure successfully provided stable household credit en
masse for the rst time in U.S. history (Gale, Gruber and Stephens-Davidowitz, 2007;
Markham, 2002; FHLBB, 1983; Goldsmith, 1968).
However, the accomplishment of increasing homeownership during this period
was also incomplete and highly unequal due to pervasive racial discrimination. Most
notably, FHA housing policies such as redlining systematically prevented AfricanAmericans from receiving mortgage credit.

This discrimination excluded African-

Americans from homeownership which was the primary channel for building wealth.
Moreover, African-Americans who did own homes were concentrated in neighborhoods where home values were aected by the self-fullling prophecies of the FHA
appraisers. These areas were cut o from sources of new investment, which caused
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their house prices to lose value compared to white neighborhoods which FHA appraisers deemed desirable. This systematic exclusion of African-Americans from the
primary wealth building channel for the middle class has featured prominently in recent calls for reparations, such as that from Ta Nahisi-Coates (Coates, 2014; Gordon,
2005; Oliver and Shapiro, 1995).
The exclusion of African-Americans from stable mortgage credit also foreshadows
a problem that contributed to the nancial crisis of 2007-2009.

Lack of access to

aordable nancial services made African-Americans vulnerable to predatory lending
because of lack of alternatives. The dominant form of housing nance for AfricanAmericans during this period was buying on contract.

The terms of this nancial

arrangement would be that the buyer would make monthly payments directly to the
seller, with the promise that they would receive the deed only once the home was
entirely paid o. However, this nancial arrangement gave African-Americans all the
risks of owning the home, with none of the benets.

African-Americans would be

responsible for all repairs to the home, similar to an owner. However, they would not
build equity in their home as the made payments, similar to a renter. Therefore, if
they fell behind on payments they would be evicted, with the seller keeping all the
equity in the home. This provided an incentive for sellers to design these contracts
to be unaordable. To this end, sellers typically inated home prices two to three
times the market rate, and included high interest rates to make monthly payments
unaordable (Coates, 2014; Satter, 2010). As will be described in the next section,
lack of access making borrowers vulnerable to predatory lending was a problem which
contributed to the 2007-2009 nancial crisis.

3.2 Weaknesses in the New Deal Regulatory Structure
The purpose of this section is to analyze the history of the housing nance regulatory structure, from 1951-2007. It identies weaknesses which the proposal in this
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paper would provide tools to address.

The primary historical argument developed

in this section is that a key weakness of the New Deal regulatory strategy was that
the ability of public options in the secondary and insurance markets to indirectly
set the terms of the primary market depended on narrowing the permissible actions
of primary market intermediaries through restrictions from above.

However, these

restrictions were vulnerable to erosion through time. Essentially, the ability of public
institutions to use the provision of support to make stable mortgages more competitive than alternatives depended on what alternatives were available. This historical
argument will be developed based on an analysis of two time periods, 1951-1979 and
1980-2007. The analysis of the rst time period will describe the forces contributing
to the erosion of restrictions, eventually leading to deregulation in the early 1980s.
The analysis of the second time period will then describe how deregulation helped to
allow unstable mortgage structures reemerge and contribute to the largest nancial
crisis since the Great Depression.

3.2.1 Regulatory Weaknesses Leading to Deregulation: 1951-1979
This section describes forces contributing to the erosion of the New Deal restrictions during the postwar period from 1951-1979, which resulted in deregulation in the
early 1980s. This section argues that the basic problem of this period was that the
New Deal restrictions were too rigid to adapt to the high ination and interest rates
of the late 1960s and 1970s. The previous section described how New Deal restrictions
essentially created a narrow business model for depository institutions, particularly
thrifts, based on originating and holding long-term, xed rate mortgages. However,
the viability of this business model depended on stable low ination and interest
rates, and restricting competition over sources of funding for depository institutions.
This section describes how the changing economic environment in the late-1960s and
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throughout the 1970s undermined both of these conditions, leading to the removal of
restrictions through deregulation in the 1980s.
The New Deal restrictions essentially created a narrow business model for the
provision of long-term, xed rate mortgages, where depository institutions would
originate these mortgages and hold them in their portfolio.

Richard Kovacevich,

former CEO of Wells Fargo, reected on this period as one in which the business of
banking was boring because, the government told banks what products they could
sell, what prices they could charge, and where they could do business. The relative
straightforwardness of the business model left to depository institutions has also been
described by the 3-6-3 rule. Banks borrowed money at the Regulation Q 3 percent
interest rate for deposits, and loaned money at 6 percent.

They were then free to

play golf by 3 p.m because there was nothing left to do (Kovacevich, 2008; Markham,
2002).
Regulation Q interest rate caps were an important part of this stable business
model.

Regulation Q prohibited the payment of interest on demand deposits, and

set a maximum rate on the amount of interest rate allowed for savings accounts.
Regulation Q was created as part of the New Deal reforms to restrict banks from
engaging in ruinous price competition. New Deal reforms saw aggressive bidding
for customers through oering higher interest rates on deposits as contributing to
the nancial instability which caused the Great Depression.

While ination and

interest rates were low, Regulation Q contributed to stability by preventing this form
of competition. Additionally, the interest rate caps provided depository institations
a subsidy by allowing them to raise funds at below market rates (D'Arista, 1994).
Ination remained low and stable until the mid-1960s. Ination in 1964 averaged
1 percent per year.

However, in the late 1960s ination started increasing due to

spending on the Vietnam war. Ination continued to rise throughout the 1970s as
well due to large increases in oil prices. By 1980, ination had reached 14 percent per
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year (Bryan, 2013). This ination caused problems for the originate and hold business
model because the value of the debt was set in nominal terms, and the interest rates
were xed. As the price level rose, this caused the real value of these assets and the
income stream derived from them to depreciate.
The high ination, in turn, led to increases in the nominal interest rates on government bonds. This posed an additional problem for depository institutions because
interest rates on government bonds increased beyond the maximum rate of interest
allowed to be paid on deposits under Regulation Q. This led to disintermediation,
as deposits moved to the money market where they could earn a higher interest rate
(Minsky, 2008; D'Arista, 1994; Wolfson, 1993).
Disintermediation in the 1970s was also facilitated by the development of close
substitutes for deposits. The ability of depository institutions to raise funds at below market rates depended on these institutions having a monopoly on the provision
of deposit accounts. As long as there were no other providers of deposit accounts,
Regulation Q interest rate caps allowed them to raise funds for a lower cost. However, money market mutual funds (MMMFs) challenged this monopoly by providing
deposit-like services (Minsky, 2008; D'Arista, 1994; Wolfson, 1993).
MMMFs were mutual funds that pooled funds from investors, and invested them in
money market instruments. The liabilities of MMMFs were technically equity shares
in the overall mutual fund, and not deposits. These liabilities were not covered by deposit insurance, and could experience loss. However, they shared many features with
deposits that made them close substitutes. First, these liabilities were relatively safe
because they were invested in stable money market instruments, such as government
bonds. Second, they were easily withdrawn on demand. Some MMMFs even issued
limited check-writing capabilities. As market interest rates rose above Regulation Q
caps, MMMFs were able to oer a higher rate of return than depository institutions,
for liabilities that were functionally similar to deposits. As a result, depository in-
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stitutions experienced disintermediation as their deposits owed to MMMFs.

The

competitive inequity between depository institutions and MMMFs created incentives
for regulators to loosen restrictions to allow depository institutions to better compete on a level playing eld.

To this end, commercial banks and thrifts developed

money market deposit accounts (MMDAs) and negotiable order of withdrawal accounts (NOWs). These were similar in nature to MMMF shares, because they were
functionally demand deposits which were allowed to pay interest. These new innovations were initially prohibited, but eventually allowed under deregulation in the 1980
Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) and 1982
Garn-St. Germain Act (Minsky, 2008; D'Arista, 1994; Wolfson, 1993).
To combat rising ination in the 1970s, Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker significantly increased interest rates in what has since been named, the Volcker Shock.

2

In 1981, the eective federal funds rate peaked at just over 19 percent.

The Vol-

cker shock eectively ended the viability of the originate and hold model because
depository institutions needed to pay a higher rate for their funding then they were
able to receive on their long-term xed-rate assets.

The increase in interest rates

was particularly onerous for the thrift industry, whose portfolios contained a higher
proportion of mortgages than commercial banks. By 1982, the entire thrift industry
was insolvent by roughly $150 billion (Black, 2013; Levitin and Wachter, 2013).

3.2.2 The Consequences of Deregulation: 1980-2007
This section discusses how the removal of restrictions on intermediaries following
deregulation weakened the ability of public institutions to indirectly regulate the primary market through participation in secondary and insurance markets. A complete
description of the eects of deregulation is beyond the scope of this essay. Instead,

2 Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve FRED Database. Accessed July 7th, 2016 from:

//fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS
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the discussion in this section will focus on the problems which the proposal in this
paper will provide tools to address. This section will describe how deregulation contributed to: 1) The reemergence of unstable mortgage structures through innovations
that redistribute risk towards households, 2) Lack of access to aordable nancial
services, and 3) Competition in laxity by regulators due to erosion of distinctions
between intermediaries.
As described in the previous section, the Volcker shock eectively ended the viability of the originate and hold business model for providing long-term xed rate
mortgages. This exposed the limits of depository institution's ability to manage interest rate risk, leading to widespread insolvency in the thrift industry. The resolution
of this crisis could have occurred through either allowing adjustable rate mortgages
(ARMs), or through securitization through the government sponsored enterprises
(GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The eventual resolution of the crisis occurred
through securitization, which renewed the viability of long-term xed-rate mortgages
by enabling the originate to distribute business model. Fannie and Freddie would also
regulate the terms of the primary market by setting the terms of access to the secondary market. However, this only occurred after deregulation removed restrictions
on depository institutions to allow them to experiment with adjustable-rate lending.
The removal of these restrictions would have wide-ranging eects that limited the
ability of Fannie and Freddie to set the terms of the primary market. These eects
will be described in detail below.
Deregulation occurred with the DIDMCA of 1980 and Garn-St. Germain Act of
1982.

In addition to allowing adjustable-rate lending, these acts also abolished an

entire range of restrictions including those on interest rates, underwriting standards,
lines of business, concentration of ownership, size of loans that can be given to a single borrower, and conicts of interest. To be sure, Congress attempted to reimpose
restrictions through the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) in
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1994. This act prohibited certain predatory lending practices by regulating balloon
payments, negative-amortizing mortgages, and many other practices. The act additionally directed the Federal Reserve to prohibit acts which were deceptive, not in
the interest of the borrower, or designed to evade the act. However, under Chairman
Greenspan the Federal Reserve refused to engage in HOEPA rulemakings despite
pressure from consumer groups. Even worse, when states enacted their own HOEPA
like regulation, federal banking regulators such as the OCC pre-empted these laws
making them no longer binding.

While the DIDMCA and Garn-St.

Germain Act

dismantled the federal regulatory structure, this preemption dismantled the remaining state regulatory structure, leaving an essentially unregulated market (Taub, 2014;
Levitin and Wachter, 2013).
Deregulation allowed the rapid reemergence of mortgage structures that were unstable because they redistributed risk back towards households.

As described in

section 1, when the HOLC created the xed-rate, fully amortizing mortgage, it redistributed interest rate risk and liquidity risk away from households and towards
nancial intermediaries. However, the general trend in mortgage innovations following deregulation was to redistribute these risks back towards households. For example,
immediately following deregulation ARMs with initial teaser rates became available.
These loans contained a lower interest rate, and hence lower monthly payments, for
an initial teaser period. At the end of this period, the interest rate would reset at a
higher rate, resulting in higher payments. In addition to redistributing interest rate
risk back to households, this loan also redistributed liquidity and market risk towards
households.

Households bore liquidity risk because these mortgages often required

renancing at the expiration of the teaser period because the increased payments
were unaordable. Additionally, market risk was already concentrated on households
under the terms of the traditional xed-rate mortgage.

Market risk also amplied

liquidity risk because if the value of the home declined suciently to cause negative
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equity for the borrower, the borrower would not be able to renance the loan. The
concentration of interest, liquidity, and market risk on households was functionally
similar to the pre-New Deal bullet loans described in section 1 (Taub, 2014; Levitin
and Wachter, 2013; Peek, 1990).
Deregulation also increased lack of access to nancial services for low and middle
income borrowers. Following deregulation in the 1980s, credit unions and thrift institutions ceased to play their traditional role of providing low-cost services to lower
and middle income households, in favor of adopting business models more similar
to commercial banks. Without the institutions that traditionally fullled this role,
a large fraction of the U.S. population is currently excluded from access to basic,
low-cost nancial services (Baradaran, 2013).
In 2013, roughly 7.7 percent of U.S. households were unbanked, dened as lacking
access to a bank account. This includes roughly 9.6 million households, containing
16.7 million adults and 8.7 million children.

However, this gure understates the

problem because a large portion of the population is underbanked. This is dened as
having a bank account, but still having to rely on high-cost, predatory nancial services like pay-day lenders. In 2013 there were an additional 20 percent of households
that were underbanked.

This includes roughly 24.8 million households, containing

50.9 million adults, and 16.6 million children.

In total, roughly 30 percent of U.S.

households are unbanked or underbanked, and thus are excluded from access to traditional nancial services.

3

Lack of access to traditional nancial services makes these

households particularly vulnerable to high cost, predatory lending practices. For example, the average payday loan contains a 400 percent interest rate, compared to
interest rates of between 12-30 percent for credit cards.

4

Additionally, the average

3 Source: 2013 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households.
7-13-2016 from:

4 Source:

https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2013report.pdf

Consumer Finance Protection Bureau.

Accessed July 7th from:

consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1567/what-payday-loan.html
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household that lacks access to traditional services spends almost 10 percent of its
income on fees for nancial transactions.

These fees totaled roughly $89 billion in

2012 alone (Baradaran, 2015; USPS, 2014).
Lack of access also made these borrowers vulnerable to mortgages that redistributed risk towards them because they did not have an alternative source of stable,
aordable mortgage credit. In the period preceding the nancial crisis, unstable mortgages concentrated risk on these borrowers. However, these borrowers were also the
least able to bear this risk because they were precisely those who had low income,
low assets, and lacked access to alternative nancing.

When house prices declined

enough to give these borrowers negative equity, these borrowers were not able to renance mortgages once the initial teaser periods expired. This caused a large number
of defaults which generated large macroeconomic externalities by contributing to the
nancial crisis of 2007-2009 (Mian and Su, 2014).
The concentration of risk through unstable mortgage structures was facilitated by
the rapid growth of the market for private-label mortgage backed securities (PLS).
Under the previous originate and hold model for mortgages, borrower's and lender's
interest were aligned because concentrating risk on subprime borrowers would also
increase credit risk for the originating institution. Additionally, during the 1990s the
underwriting standards required to be eligible for securitization through the GSE's
helped to reestablish the traditional xed-rate mortgage as the dominant mortgage
during the 1990s.

However, the rapid growth of the PLS market from 2002-2006

allowed these risky mortgages to be securitized, hence removing the credit risk from
the originating institutions. This created an incentive structure where the incentives
of lender's were not aligned with those of borrowers. Instead, originating institutions
were incentivized to originate a larger volume of mortgages to gain more fee revenue,
without regard to the credit quality of mortgages being originated. The rise of the
PLS market thus weakened the ability of the GSE's to regulate the primary market
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through limiting access to the secondary market (Taub, 2014; Levitin and Wachter,
2013).
These private mortgage-backed securities could be sold to investors, who were only
interested in safe securities that did not bear credit risk, because the quality of the underlying mortgages was grossly misrepresented. A recent body of economic research
has now extensively documented that investors in private MBS were systematically
defrauded and misled about the quality of the securities which they purchased. For
example, Piskorski, Seru and Witkin (2015) show that fraud was endemic to this
market because, a signicant degree of misrepresentation exists

across all

reputable

intermediaries involved in the sale of mortgages, [emphasis in original]. A related
study by Grin and Maturana (2016) conrms these ndings be showing that approximately half of the loans used as collateral for MBS exhibited at least one of three
easy to measure indicators of fraud: appraisal value ination, unreported second liens,
and misreported owner occupancy status. These ndings should also be interpreted
as a conservative lower bound for the incidence of fraud because they do not measure
all types of fraud. In a recent ruling from a lawsuit concerning whether the quality
of mortgages used as collateral for MBS was accurately described or misrepresented,
District Judge Denise Cote stated that, The magnitude of falsity, conservatively
measured, is enormous.

5

Deregulation also weakened the ability of regulators to prohibit these practices
directly because the erosion of distinctions between intermediaries allowed them to
switch their charters to be regulated by whoever would oer the least stringent restrictions. This produced an incentive for regulators to compete to oer the lowest

5 From ruling in

Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Nomura Holding America, May 11th, 2015.

The FHFA sued 16 banks for misrepresentations made in oering documents and prospectuses for
securities sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. All but Nomura and Royal Bank Scotland settled
out of court, and the court ruled against these institutions in trial on May 11th, 2015. Accessed on

July 7th, 2016 from: https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2077713/
ruling-on-mortgage-fraud-in-2008-crisis.pdf
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standards - competition in laxity. The Oce of Thrift Supervision (OTS) was likely
the most spectacular example of competition in laxity from the period leading to the
2007-2009 nancial crisis. OTS funding was based on a levy on the amount of assets
under its supervision. The OTS therefore had an incentive to increase the amount of
assets under its regulation so that it could increase its funding. To do so, it oered
banks less stringent regulation, and provided regulatory cover for institutions responsible for the largest failures of the crisis. These institutions include AIG, Countrywide,
Indymac, Lehman Brothers, and Washington Mutual. That AIG, an insurance company, and Lehman Brothers, one of the largest investment banks, could recharter as
thrift institutions, which were originally designed to be narrowly specialized institutions for providing mortgage credit to households, illustrates how far deregulation
had eroded distinctions between institutions (Taub, 2014; FCIC, 2011).

6

In a now infamous 2003 photo,

the director of the OTS, James Gilleran, posed

with three bank lobbyists to advertise the loose regulatory approach of the OTS. In
front of Gilleran and the lobbyists sat a stack of papers wrapped in red tape, which
signied federal regulations.

Behind them was a banner which read, Cutting Red

Tape. In this picture, Gilleran held a chainsaw to the stack of regulations to dramatically show the commitment of the OTS to protecting nancial institutions from
regulatory oversight. John Reich held garden shears in this picture, and continued
this trend when he replaced Gilleran as director of OTS. The OTS was abolished
for this negligence following the nancial crisis from 2007-2009 (Taub, 2014; FCIC,
2011).
Due to the role of unstable mortgages in contributing to the nancial crisis, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was created as part of the DoddFrank reforms.

The CFPB has authority to regulate any person that engages in

6 This picture was published in the FDIC Annual Report of 2003. Accessed 5-5-2016 from:

//www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report/2003annualreport/ar03full.pdf
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oering or providing a consumer nancial product or service. The authority to regulate several dierent types of institutions helps to prevent the competition in laxity
described above. The CFPB also has the authority to use rulemakings to prohibit
unfair, deceptive, or abusive nancial products. For regulating mortgages, the most
signicant CFPB reform is the ability-to-repay rule. This rule requires that lenders
make a good faith eort to ensure that borrowers can repay the loan, such as documenting income, employment, other debt or expenses, and credit history. Failure
to do so provides the borrower a legal defense against foreclosure.

The CFPB has

also establish a class of qualied mortgages which are considered to have met the
requirements of the ability to repay rule.

Qualied mortgages are prohibited from

containing features such as negative amortization, balloon payments, excess upfront
points and fees, and limit how much of your income can go towards debt (Levitin,
2012).

7

However, the ability of the CFPB to protect consumers is also subject to important limitations. Most importantly, the CFPB's powers are limited to ensuring
consumer protection through restrictions from above. The CFPB can use rulemakings to curtail consumer protection abuses, but cannot mandate that intermediaries
provide products which embody best practices. For example, the CFPB cannot mandate that a lender provide plain vanilla products to which more complex products
can be compared to. Additionally, the CFPB cannot mandate that a lender provide
services to those who currently lack access to nancial services (Levitin, 2012). Another limitation to restrictions imposed from above is that there are detection and
enforcement costs in identifying abuses and prohibiting them. For example, prior to
rulemaking the CFPB must identify the abusive practice, and thoroughly document

7 For more description of the ability-to-pay rule and qualied mortgages, see:

http://www.
consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1787/what-ability-repay-rule-why-it-important-me.html
and http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1789/what-qualified-mortgage.html.
Accessed July 7th, 2016.
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it. To enforce the restriction, the CFPB must le a civil suit, and engage in extensive litigation. Therefore, there is potentially substantial lag time between when the
abusive practice occurs, when it is discovered, and when the prohibition is enforced.
The next section of this paper will describe how the creation of a public bank and
online nancial services marketplace can complement the CFPBs current abilities by
addressing these shortcomings through competition from below.

3.3 A New Public Option
This section presents the proposal for the creation of a new public option for
household nance in the primary market.

This section rst describes the features

of the new public option, which include the creation of a public bank and online
nancial services marketplace, as well as the regulatory tools each of these features
would provide.

The section then discusses the similarities and dierences between

this proposal and the proposals for postal banking by the USPS OIG. It concludes
by discussing likely banking industry criticisms of this proposal.
Overall, the new public option would have two related features. First, the public
option would include the creation of a new public bank which directly provides basic
nancial services, including mortgages, to households. Second, it would include an
online nancial services marketplace. These two features would use competition and
transparency to address the two regulatory weaknesses associated with deregulation
identied in section 2.

These problems include private nancial innovations that

redistribute risk to households, and regulatory arbitrage.
The rst feature of the new public option would be the creation of a public bank
to serve the needs of households.

This bank would be organized as a government

corporation, rather than a government agency, to increase administrative exibility.
The primary dierence between a government corporation and a government agency
is that the government corporation is not subject to the congressional appropriations
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process, because it is required to generate enough revenue to cover costs by providing
goods and services. Therefore it has much more exibility in the design and execution of its budget (Kosar, 2011). The public bank would be a member of the Federal
Reserve system, and have deposits insured by the FDIC. The bank would be regulated by the Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, and CFPB. The bank would also work in
coordination with the FHFA to meet federal housing objectives.
The public bank would directly provide basic nancial services to households. The
services provided would include deposit services, small dollar loans, and mortgages.
The basic deposit services would include checking and savings accounts, check cashing,
direct deposit, and online banking. The checking account would also include a public
debit card. This card would allow online bill payments, mobile payments, e-commerce
payments, and any other activity traditionally associated with debit cards.

The

public debit card would also allow access to a nationwide network of surcharge-free
ATMs, which would be located in post oces. Additionally, the public bank would
oer payment products like electronic money orders and international remittances.
These basic deposit and payment services are similar to those proposed by the USPS
OIG (USPS, 2015, 2014). The USPS proposal would implement all of these services
through a reloadable, prepaid debit card, provided by a partnering with a private
nancial institution.

In contrast with the USPS proposal, the public bank would

simply oer a traditional debit card linked to a deposit account, and not need to
partner with a private institution to provide this service.
From the perspective of promoting nancial inclusion, it would be best if these
basic deposit services were provided free of charge.

Revenue to cover operational

costs for these services could be derived from lending income or the provision of other
payment services such as money orders.

Revenue for this could also be generated

by charging sellers a fee for participating in the online public nancial services marketplace, described below.

However, if these revenue sources were not sucient to
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cover operational costs for deposit services, then a modest fee could be also assessed.
Providing free checking accounts and charging a fee for these services are both common in private nancial institutions. Currently, 39 percent of checking accounts in
commercial banks are free, and 76 percent of checking accounts in credit unions are
free.

8

The government should also provide small dollar loans which would replace unaffordable non-traditional lending, such as payday lending. The loan terms would be
similar to those proposed by the USPS. The USPS proposal would make small dollar loans available to any borrower that deposited two consecutive paychecks. Users
could borrow up to 50 percent of their gross paycheck, and make required monthly
payments of 5 percent of their gross paycheck. The USPS provides the hypothetical
example of a borrower making $18,000 per year, and paid in bi-weekly paychecks.
This person would be able to borrow up to $375. If the loan contained a 25 percent
interest rate and $25 origination fee, the loan could be paid o in 5.5 months with
interest and fees totalling $48. This presents substantial savings relative to the typical
payday loan, where interest and fees would total $520, implying an interest rate of
nearly 400 percent (USPS, 2014).
Alternatively, the loan terms could follow the template used in the FDIC Small
Loan Pilot Program. This program issued loans for $2,500 or less, with repayment
terms 90 days or greater, and a 36 percent interest rate. This program found that
longer loan terms reduced default rates, so longer terms should be encouraged (FDIC,
2010). Additionally, I propose that once a borrower successfully repaid a small dollar
loan, they be allowed access to a small dollar revolving line of credit.

This would

provide users a more exible safety net for unexpected expenses than having to apply

8 Data on free checking accounts come from:

http://www.bankrate.com/finance/checking/
want-free-checking-check-out-credit-unions-1.aspx. Accessed June 30th, 2016.
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for each loan separately. This would also reduce underwriting costs by removing the
need to underwrite every small loan to the same individual separately.
In addition, I propose that the public bank provide the full range of government
guaranteed mortgages, such as those insured by the FHA or guaranteed by the GSE's.
The public bank would focus on issuing aordable, plain vanilla mortgages with
transparent terms and fees.

Mortgages to low-income borrowers would be insured

through the FHA, and follow the underwriting templates they have already developed.
Mortgages to middle or high income borrowers would need to conform to current
GSE underwriting guidelines. The bulk of mortgages issued through the public bank
would be securitized in the secondary market. Once these services have been proven
successful, it would also be straightforward to expand services to provide any other
type of government guaranteed loan, such as small business loans guaranteed by the
SBA. Expansion into other government guaranteed loans would be straightforward
because the public bank could take advantage of already developed underwriting
templates, and not be subject to credit risk due to the guarantees.
A related question is whether the bank should oer a full range of consumer
loans, such as credit cards and auto-loans.

For the purposes of this proposal, I

would recommend that the public bank not oer these services. Instead, the public
bank should make them available through private providers in the online marketplace
described below.

In principle, I think the government could likely provide these

services successfully. However, from a practical perspective, it would make more sense
for the public bank to initially focus on providing a more limited range of services.
This would avoid the need to create new underwriting standards, and reduce the
public bank's exposure to risk.
Directly providing services to households would provide several tools to accomplish
the regulatory goal of improving consumer protection, and address weaknesses in the
regulatory structure associated with deregulation. First, directly providing services
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to households would indirectly regulate the entire market by enforcing a quality oor
through competition, rather than through restrictions from above. High-cost nancial services, such as payday or title lending, would simply not be competitive with
the low-cost, small dollar loans provided by the public bank. This quality oor would
also address the two regulatory weaknesses associated with deregulation described in
section 2. First, the quality oor would prevent nancial innovations in mortgages
from redistributing risk away from intermediaries and towards households, i.e. the
type of innovation that ourished after deregulation. Mortgage innovations that were
riskier for households would not be competitive with public mortgages which were
less risky. Second, the ability to regulate through competition from below would also
prevent the regulatory arbitrage that occurred following deregulation. As intermediaries adopted similar business models following the removal of restrictions on their
activities, they could change their charter to whatever regulatory institution would
oer the least restrictions. The quality oor prevents this because it would apply to
all institutions, regardless of the type of charter, or even if they lacked a charter.
This quality oor would also be similar to the proposal that the CFPB mandate that private lenders oer plain vanilla products. These plain vanilla products
would serve as a reference point which more complex products could be compared to.
This would ensure that the additional mortgage terms added value for consumers,
rather than shifted risk towards them.

The rejection of the plain vanilla proposal

also highlights a key weakness of the CFPB. The CFPB is limited to prohibiting
worse practices through restrictions, and mandate best practices (Levitin, 2012). In
contrast, the public bank could directly oer products embodying best practices for
reducing risk for households. In doing so, they would incentivize private institutions
to also oer these products through competition, rather than mandating they do from
above.
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Second, directly providing services would improve consumer protection by directly
providing access to nancial services for those who currently lack them. As described
in the previous section, between 30 percent of U.S. households either lacks access to a
deposit account, or has a deposit account but is still forced to rely on non-traditional
high-cost services such as payday lending. Providing those who lack access with services also provides a way to build credit history for the underserved, thus allowing
them to eventually be included in the traditional market (Baradaran, 2015; USPS,
2015, 2014). Moreover, as described in section 2, those who lack access to traditional
nancial services are vulnerable to nancial innovations that redistribute risk towards
them, because they have no other alternatives. However, these innovations generated
substantial macroeconomic externalities because they concentrated risk on those least
able to bear it, thus contributing to the nancial crisis. Directly providing the underserved with services would prevent this problem by giving those who currently lack
services low-risk alternatives.
Finally, similar to the experience of the HOLC described in section 1, directly
providing services to households would give the government the ability to regulate
through setting trends with nancial innovations. The government could experiment
with creating new forms of nancing for households, and standardize best practices to
allow them to be adopted on a widespread basis by private institutions. This would
provide an alternative to the regulatory weakness associated with private innovation
following deregulation, which often redistributed risk away from intermediaries.
For example, one possible area for innovation would be to experiment with more
equity-like nancing structures for mortgages that shield borrowers from the market
risk associated with house price declines, such as shared responsibility mortgages
(SRMs).

The nancing structure of SRMs is dierent from traditional debt-based

mortgage structures because the lender oers downside protection to the borrower in
cases of house price declines. If the value of the home decreases to below the purchase
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price of the home, their monthly payments would be proportionally reduced, while the
amortization schedule remained the same. As the house price recovered, the monthly
payment would be proportionately increased until it reached the original level.

In

return for this protection, the borrower would oer the lender a small percentage

9

of any capital gains on the home due to house price appreciation.

In contrast, the

distributional terms inherent to debt-nancing specify that the borrower take rst
losses from house price declines, until their equity is wiped out (Mian and Su, 2014).
The distributional terms inherent in debt-nancing cause negative externalities
from a macroeconomic standpoint because this nancing structure can cause large
declines in spending following house price declines, as was seen during the nancial
crisis of 2007-2009. Mian and Su have argued that widespread use of these mortgages
would have signicantly reduced the severity of the Great Recession (Mian and Su,
2014). Some form of nancial structure such as SRMs that results in a more equitable
distribution of losses between debtor and creditor could potentially oer a superior
alternative to the current structure of mortgages. However, it will likely take some
experimentation and standardization before this structure could be adopted on a
widespread basis. Directly providing services would give the government the ability
to accomplish this.
An obvious concern with the creation of a public bank is that it will expose taxpayers to loss. Providing basic payment services is a relatively low risk enterprise, because
it does not involve lending.

However, providing loans of any type does necessarily

expose taxpayers to some risk.

This risk can be minimized through securitization,

ensuring risk-pricing of loans rather than politicized underwriting, high capital re-

9 ? provide rough calculations suggesting that 5 percent of any capital gains would be sucient to
cover the costs of the downside protection. However, in practice the particular percentage charged
will likely vary depending on a number of factors.
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quirements, and explicitly pricing the government's guarantee of the public bank's
debt. I consider these factors in detail below.
First and most basic, most of the mortgages originated by the public bank will
be securitized in secondary markets. Securitization provides two forms of protection
against loss. First, securitization directly removes credit and interest rate risk from
the public bank's balance sheet.

Second, securitization provides a revenue stream

from servicing mortgages that can be used to oset losses. Additionally, mortgages
that were held in portfolio would be high quality because they would either be insured
through the FHA/VA, or conform to GSE underwriting standards. These underwriting standards have benetted from the experience of several decades of development,
and will help to shield the public bank from loss.
Second, the public bank will have to ensure that underwriting is not politicized.
One could imagine the possibility of substantial political pressure to lower underwriting standards in an attempt to make loans more widely available, leading to underpricing of risk. A bulwark against politicized underwriting is that this institution will
be organized as a public corporation which is required to raise enough revenue to cover
costs. The public bank would bear rst losses due to inadequate underwriting, and so
would be interested in resisting any pressures to loosen underwriting standards. Additionally, the public bank will be regulated by the FDIC, OCC, and Federal Reserve.
These regulators have substantial experience in best risk management practices, and
will provide external controls against inadequate underwriting.
The danger of politicized underwriting is likely most acute for small dollar loans,
because risk-pricing may conict with the goal of nancial inclusion. To the extent
that these loans are made to higher risk borrowers, such as those that do not have access to traditional nancial services, they will require higher interest rates. This is one
reason why interest rates are high at non-traditional lenders such as payday lenders.
However, there is also good reason to believe that the government could provide small

113

dollar loans at lower cost than non-traditional lenders, while still adequately pricing
risk.

The government has a lower cost structure due to 1) economies of scale, 2)

lower overhead costs, and 3) non-prot structure. Were the public bank to partner
with the USPS to provide these services through the post oce branch network as
proposed below, the government would be able to benet from large economies of
scale and lower overhead costs. These economies of scale would allow the creation of
standardized underwriting templates which would reduce underwriting costs. Utilizing already existing post oces, as well as a robust online platform, would also lower
overhead costs. Finally, not needing to generate prots would also lower the cost of
these loans.

These cost-advantages should allow the public bank to meet the goal

of nancial inclusion by oering these services at lower cost than currently available,
while still adequately pricing risk.
Alternatively, if these cost advantages are not adequate to provide these small
dollar loans at a low enough cost to make them suciently available to the nancially
underserved, then the public could consider directly subsidizing them through Congressional appropriations. This could be economically justied based on preventing
the negative macroeconomic externalities described above. Additionally, this could
also be justied based on the positive externalities of these services. The provision
of small dollar loans can be interpreted as a social insurance program that provides
a safety net. To be sure, the primary beneciary of the small dollar loan is the person who needs it because of some unexpected shock. However, we all benet when
our neighbors have a safety net.

Those who are desperate for money often resort

to unethical behavior to obtain the money, resulting in larger social costs.

To the

extent that the community benets when its weakest members have a safety net, but
this benet is not priced, we would expect markets to under produce this service.
Therefore, there is an economic argument for directly subsidizing this service.
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A third mechanism to protect taxpayers from loss is to reduce allowable leverage
through a high capital requirement for the public bank. To be sure, the nal capital requirements would need to be determined based on the expertise of the Federal
Reserve, OCC, and FDIC. However, the experience of the 2007-2009 nancial crisis
can provide a benchmark for capital requirements sucient to withstand even catastrophic losses. For example, combined mortgage losses for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and private mortgage insurers during the 2007-2009 nancial crisis were roughly 4-5
percent of the loan balance (Zandi, 2013). Therefore, a capital requirement of 7-10
percent would provide a very conservative level of capitalization able to withstand
even catastrophic losses similar to the crisis of 2007-2009. For small dollar unsecured
loans, the FDIC Small Dollar Loan Pilot Program, which occurred from 2007-2009
during the nancial crisis, can provide a benchmark estimate. The program provided
small dollar loans under $1,000, and near small dollar loans of between $1,000-$2,500.
The charge o rate for small dollar loans peaked at 6.2 percent in the fourth quarter
of 2009, while the charge o rate for near small dollar loans peaked at 9 percent
(FDIC, 2010).

Therefore, a higher capital requirement of between 10-12 percent

would be a strong cushion against losses in small dollar loans even during periods of
high economic stress.
The last mechanism protecting taxpayers against loss would be to explicitly price
the implicit guarantee of the public's banks debt. As a public corporation, the public
bank's debt would be backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government.
However, if this guarantee was not explicitly priced, the government would not have
any reserves against loss. This guarantee could be priced by having the public bank
pay a small assessment for any non-deposit debt issued. This assessment could then
be placed into an insurance fund managed by the FDIC. The FDIC would be an
appropriate institution to manage this insurance fund because this guarantee is functionally similar to deposit insurance. Explicitly pricing this guarantee would also help
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to ensure that this institution did not enjoy a competitive advantage compared with
private banks, due to lower borrowing costs. Overall, for the loans held in portfolio
the combination of prudent underwriting, high capital requirements, and explicitly
priced government guarantee should provide redundant levels of taxpayer protection
sucient to withstand even catastrophic nancial crisis.
A nal question concerning the public bank is how large we would expect this
bank to be. To be sure, there is likely too much uncertainty to credibly to estimate
the precise market share this institution would be expected to account for.

This

would depend on a number of factors such as the outcome of market competition, the
state of the economy, and how the nancial system evolves through time. However,
it is plausible to anticipate that the public bank will likely be roughly as large as a
medium-sized nancial services provider. Due to the limited nature of the services
oered through the bank, we would not expect it to be as big as the largest rms,
which all oer a substantially larger range of services. Indeed, the top 5 banks - J.P.
Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and U.S. Bancorp - control

10

almost half the assets of the banking industry.

That being said, were the public

bank to partner with USPS to deliver services through the postal branch network,
as described in more detail below, the public bank would be able to increase the
total number of bank branches by one-third. Therefore, it would have a substantially
larger geographic presence than any other nancial services institution.

This large

geographic network would likely allow the public bank to grow in size comparable to
a medium-sized institution, despite the limited range of services oered.

10 See Schaefer, Steve, December 3, 2014, Five Biggest U.S. Banks Control Nearly Half Industry's

Accessed July 4th, 2016 from: http://www.forbes.com/sites/
steveschaefer/2014/12/03/five-biggest-banks-trillion-jpmorgan-citi-bankamerica/
#427f3a711d43 .

$15 Trillion in Assets, Forbes.
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3.3.1 A Public Online Financial Services Marketplace
The second service that the new public option would provide would be to manage an online nancial services marketplace. This marketplace would allow private
intermediaries to oer a wide range of nancial services to households, provided that
these services met high consumer protection standards. Services from the public bank
would also be oered through this marketplace, and directly compete with private
services. This marketplace would also include a consumer protection ratings system
and consumer reviews. The consumer protection ratings system would be developed
in coordination with the CFPB. Both individual products as well as service providers
could be rated. If a service provider's rating fell below a threshold, they could lose
access to the online market place. This online nancial services marketplace would
be similar to the health insurance market places created by the Aordable Care Act,
which also includes a ratings system for health insurance plans.
Providing consumer protection ratings in an online marketplace would help to prevent consumer protection abuses through increasing transparency and standardizing
comparison of terms.

Standardized ratings systems have been successfully used in

numerous contexts to eliminate consumer protection abuses based on informational
asymmetries or outright fraud. For example, grain is often used in economics textbooks as the canonical example of a uniform product.

However, in actuality grain

quality is highly heterogeneous across numerous dimensions such as type of grain,
weight per bushel, presence of other seeds, amount of foreign material such as glass
or stones, the amount of animal lth, and many other measures. The development
of a rating system by the U.S. Department of Agriculture allowed wheat to be easily
traded because the buyer knows exactly what they are getting (Akerlof and Shiller,
2015).

Standardization would also allow for easier securitization and widespread

adoption of best practices.
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This ratings system could also be modeled o of that developed by the Aordable
Care Act for rating consumer protection in health insurance plans.

Financial and

health services share many similar informational asymmetries that provide fertile soil
for deceptive practices.

For example, when a patient walks into a doctor's oce,

they do not always know exactly what health problem they are suering from, or the
necessary treatments to cure them. They rely on the doctor's professional knowledge,
and trust the doctor to not prescribe unnecessary treatments of little medical value
that would enrich the doctor (Arrow, 1963). Similarly, when a borrower applies for
a loan, the loan underwriter typically has better knowledge of what they can aord
than the borrower does. The borrower relies on the loan underwriter's professional
knowledge to provide them with an aordable loan that is in their nancial best
interest (Campbell et al., 2011).
Financial contracts and health insurance contracts are also similar in that their
complexity provides many areas to hide fees or other contract terms. Developing a
standardized template for rating consumer protection could prevent consumer protection abuses by increasing transparency of services, shine light on hidden contractual
clauses, and create a standard pricing system to eliminate hidden fees. Hidden fees
and transactions costs are especially onerous for rst time homebuyers. Total transactions costs can often total over half the down payment for rst time home buyers
(Akerlof and Shiller, 2015).
The consumer protection ratings system would also help to address the two regulatory weaknesses associated with deregulation that were discussed in section 2. First,
it would help to prevent nancial innovations that redistributed risk away from nancial intermediaries and towards households. New private innovations would need
to be rated before they could be listed on the public marketplace. Innovations that
redistributed risk towards households would receive low ratings. If these innovations
redistributed too much risk, their ratings would suciently low that they could not
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be listed. For example, if a private bank wanted to list a new mortgage structure, the
public bank in coordination with the CFPB would evaluate the mortgage based on
how the mortgage terms distributed interest rate, market, and liquidity risks between
borrower and lender. Various fees such as delinquency fees and prepayment penalties
could also be included in the rating. Additionally, if the new mortgage structure had
some prior usage in the private market, average default rates could also be included.
Each of these features would receive a score based on how they predicted default, or
some other negative outcome. A weighted average of these scores would then be combined into a total score. If this score predicted a level of defaults above an acceptable
threshold, for example one standard error above the mean default rate for a 30 year
xed-rate mortgage, then this new mortgage would not be listed.
Second, these ratings would apply to all institutions, regardless of type of charter or lack of charter. This would prevent the regulatory arbitrage which occurred
following deregulation.

Institutions would not be able to avoid this rating system

by switching charters to a less stringent regulatory authority. Moreover, unregulated
entities such as shadow banks would not be able to avoid this ratings system and still
be listed in the public marketplace.
Consumer reviews of products and sellers would also help to supplement the regulatory eectiveness of the consumer protection ratings system. Consumer reviews
would give consumers a voice in addressing consumer protection issues as they emerge,
and serve as an early warning system. If enough negative reviews accumulated for
a product or seller, then their consumer protection rating would be reviewed by the
public bank and CFPB. If this review found that these negative reviews were warranted, then the product or sellers rating would be downgraded. If the downgrade
was suciently large, this product or seller could be excluded from the online marketplace. Limiting access to the online marketplace to products and sellers that had
high consumer protection ratings would directly regulate products and sellers partic-
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ipating in the marketplace, but would also indirectly regulate products and seller in
the broader private marketplace through competition. Lenders outside of the public
marketplace would need to compare the services to those oered in the public marketplace to show borrowers that they contained similar protections and were a better
deal.
Finally, managing an online marketplace would also improve private regulation of
the marketplace. For example, one of the primary forms of fraud which contributed
to the housing bubble was appraisal value ination (Grin and Maturana, 2016).
Loan ocers told appraisers what price the house needed to be appraised at in order
to make the loan go through. This contributed to the ination of the bubble through
increasing house prices.
loan ocers.

Appraisers are formally supposed to be independent from

However, loan ocers were able to gain leverage over appraisers by

threatening to blacklist them if they did not provide the desired appraisal values. A
2007 survey of 1,200 appraisers conducted by the October Research Corporation found
that 90 percent of appraisers reported that mortgage brokers and others pressured
them to inate appraisal values in order to approve more loans, and that 75 percent of
appraisers reported the possibility of being blacklisted for not providing the inated
values requested (Murray, 2009).

3.3.2 Relation to Existing Postal Banking Proposals
The proposal for a new public option in this paper builds o of the proposals for
postal banking from the USPS OIG (USPS, 2015, 2014).

However, there are also

important dierences. The primary dierence is that I propose that the public bank
be constituted as an independent agency whose main mission is improving regulation,
rather than as a subsidiary agency whose primary goal is revenue generation for the
USPS. This is to prevent any conict that may arise between revenue generation and
the regulatory mission of the institution.
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The tension between generating revenue for the USPS, and the public mission of
providing low-cost nancial services to those that lack them, is the primary drawback
I see in the USPS proposal.

The USPS proposals argue that they would be able

to provide nancial services at lower cost than private industry because of lower
overhead costs and economies of scale. It is likely that these cost-advantages would
allow the USPS, or the public bank, to sustainably provide these services at a lower
price than is currently available in the private sector. However, to the extent that the
provision of these services would need to also generate revenue to fund mail delivery,
these services would require a higher price. In the end, it may not be feasible for the
nancial diculties of the postal system to be paid for by the poor (Levitin, 2014).
While I propose the new public bank be constituted as an independent organization, it would still be useful for this institution to partner with the USPS to take
advantage of the postal service's large geographic branch network. The primary benet I see in the postal banking proposals is that the wide scope of the geographic
branch network - a post oce in every ZIP code - would make the USPS particularly
well-suited for providing nancial services to those who currently lack it. The post
oce currently has more than 35,000 post oces which could serve as local nancial
services providers.

In comparison there are roughly 95,000 bank branches.

There-

fore, a partnership between the public bank and the USPS would single-handedly
increase the total number of branch locations serving communities by over one-third.
Additionally, 59 percent of post oce branches are located in ZIP codes with either
a single or no bank branches. Moreover, these post oce branches are unied into
a single national network which is signicantly larger than any private network. For
example, the largest single bank branch network belongs to Wells Fargo, and includes
roughly 6,300 bank branches (Baradaran, 2015; USPS, 2014).
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In partnering with the USPS, this new public option could still generate some
revenue for the USPS. Revenue could be generated through renting space from postal
branches or through the sale of nancial products provided by the public bank. For
example, the postal service could gain revenue through helping borrowers apply for
loans that would then be underwritten by the public bank. This arrangement would
also be easier to implement for the post oce than directly providing these services
itself.

3.3.3 Would the Public Bank Create Unfair Competition?
The nancial services industry will almost certainly oppose this proposal on the
grounds that a public bank would create unfairly subsidized competition.

To be

sure, the goal of this proposal is to regulate the market through fair public-private
competition, rather than unfairly subsidized competition.

To this end, there are

mechanisms in this proposal to ensure that competition between the public bank and
traditional banks is on a level playing eld. First, the public bank would be required
to generate enough revenue to cover costs, and would not be explicitly externally
subsidized. Second, I proposed above that the guarantee of the public banks debt be
explicitly priced to insure taxpayers against loss. This would also help to ensure fair
competition by reducing the ability of the public bank to borrow funds at lower cost
than private banks due to government guarantee of its debt. Third, I also proposed
that the public bank have high capital requirements to protect taxpayers against
loss.

However, these capital requirements are higher than those for private banks,

which would put the public bank at a competitive disadvantage. Finally, the limited
product range of the public bank also reduces the scope of competition. For example,
commercial banks are typically not interested in oering borrowers small dollar loans

http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/10/05/24-7-wall-st-banks-with-mostbranches/16648133/ .
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because they are less protable than larger loans. Therefore oering these products
would not be in direct competition with commercial banks.
Additionally, the public bank would also provide private banks with a range of
benets.

For example, the public banking system could serve as a mechanism for

bringing new users into the private banking system. The public bank would increase
access to those who currently lack it, and potentially help them build credit history.
Due to the limited nature of the services the public bank would oer, these new users
would then migrate into the traditional private nancial services system when they
needed a wider range of services. Another potential benet is that if the public bank
allowed members to deposit and withdraw funds at postal branches, it would be easy
to extend this capability to private institutions as well.

Private banks would then

have access to a branch network that is 5-6 times larger than any single private bank
network, and located in every ZIP code in the country. Additionally, private banks
would be able to access the online nancial services marketplace, potentially gaining
new business. Allowing access to the postal branch network and online marketplace
would also help to level the playing eld between smaller community banks and larger
commercial banks.
Finally, it is likely that the public bank will gain market share, at the expense of
private banks, through fair competition. This competition would represent a limitation on the private banks' current domain. However, this limitation would fulll the
important public purpose of regulating market failures in the private sector, and providing goods and services that private institutions are not adequately providing. As
described in the second section of this paper, serious consumer protection abuses by
private nancial services providers concentrated risk on those least able to bear it, and
contributed to the worst nancial crisis since the Great Depression. The terms which
distribute risk in mortgages are therefore legitimate objects of public regulation due to
the large macroeconomic externalities they can potentially generate. Moreover, these
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consumer protection abuses rapidly reemerge absent a regulatory framework sucient to suppress them. Public-private competition would provide regulatory tools to
prevent these abuses which are likely more durable than those currently available.
Moreover, public-private competition will only be onerous for nancial institutions to the extent that their business model relies on consumer protection abuses for
prots. For example, this competition will likely by strongly felt by non-traditional
lenders, like payday lenders. Competition will make these institutions need to change
their business model to one that does not rely on charging the poor 400 percent interest rates, or risk being displaced by low-cost public alternatives. However, through
directly providing services the public bank would also be creating a sustainable business model for small dollar loans which could be adopted. Therefore public banking
would also provide these institutions a pathway for change, in addition to compelling
them to change through competition.
An irony of this proposal is that in many ways, the image of the public bank would
be to fulll the role of the limited public utility which the New Deal envisioned for
private intermediaries, as described in section 1. Rather than imposing restrictions
on private intermediaries to fulll this role, under this proposal the government will
directly perform this function itself, and in doing so improve regulation of the private
market as well. This is appropriate because this type of limited public utility could
still provide important functions, however private intermediaries are not interested in
playing this limited role. Private intermediaries were always interested in signicantly
broadening their business activites beyond that of a narrowly restricted public utility.
For example, former CEO of Wells Fargo Dick Kovacevich described the passage of
the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, which represented the nal repeal of the New
Deal Glass-Steagall act, as, a change I personally worked on for two decades. So, by
the year 2000, after a quarter century of deregulation, nancial services companies
could sell any nancial product, in any part of the U.S., at competitive, market-
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driven prices, (Kovacevich, 2008). While public-private competition under the new
proposal may restrict the domain of private institutions in some areas, there would
still be a much wider domain of action for these institutions than was allowed prior
to deregulation.

3.4 Conclusion
The proposal in this paper to create a public bank and manage an online nancial
services marketplace would allow the government to use competition and transparency
to prevent consumer protection abuses in nancial services. These tools would complement the CFPB's current capabilities, helping to ensure that consumers received
nancial products consistent with their best interest. However, in closing it is also
important to acknowledge the limitations of the tools provided by this proposal. The
main limitation of this proposal for housing nance is that in restricting the discussion
to the creation of new primary market institutions, it does not focus on the current
discussion of reforms of secondary market institutions.
Since the 2007-2009 nancial crisis, the government has played a larger role in supporting mortgage origination due to the withdrawal of private capital. Since 2008, the
GSE's have guaranteed 60 percent of new mortgage originations, while the FHA/VA
has guaranteed another 20 percent (Frame et al., 2015). This has led to a widespread
debate concerning possible institutional structures for the secondary market, as well
as the appropriate role for government in this market. As of 2013, there have been
at least 26 prominent proposals from academics, think tanks, industry, and policy
makers for reforming the secondary market, including 4 which were introduced as
bills in the House of Representatives.

12

These proposals have spanned a wide range

12 For example, in 2013 the Center for American Progress compiled a summary of 26 secondary

market reform plans.
Retrieved July 10th, 2016 from: https://www.americanprogress.org/
wp-content/uploads/2013/09/GriffithHousingTable-revised.pdf
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of institutional structures, including fully private, fully public, and hybrid publicprivate structures. A full review of these plans are beyond the scope of this paper.
However, it is worth noting that regardless of the nal structure agreed upon for the
secondary market, the regulatory tools provided by this proposal would be useful for
reducing credit risk in the mortgages to be securitized. The tools in this paper are
tailored for reducing consumer protection abuses. However, this would also reduce
credit risk to the extent consumer protection abuses increase the probability of default. Indeed, reducing credit risk in this paper would be more important for the more
lightly regulated fully private proposals. These tools would help to reduce the gross
misrepresentation of credit risk in private MBS which contributed to the 2007-2009
nancial crisis, as described in section 2.
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